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MARTINS AND EÇA: TRANSTEXTUAL INTERPRETATIONS, THEORIES OF HISTORY, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC THEORY*

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Abstract

Several ideas taken seriously by the Portuguese economist, historian and social theorist Oliveira Martins (1845-94), and as such exposed in an academically respectable fashion, suffer a literary parody by his friend, the novelist Eça de Queirós (1845-1900), in his *oriental* novels, in a tonality in which dominate the chiaroscuro and the labyrinth-like mood. Amongst those are: the importance of randomness in history, Arian supremacy and the opposition between the so-called European and Chinese models of economy and society. Distancing himself from the alleged erudition and scientific positions of Martins, Eça allows himself to express sympathy towards the whole of human experience. The social reality towards which Eça was less sympathetic was indeed probably... the Portuguese one.

Resumo

Várias ideias tomadas a sério pelo economista, historiador e teórico social Oliveira Martins (1845-1894), e por si expostas de modo academicamente respeitável, são parodiadas literariamente pelo seu amigo Eça de Queirós (1845-1900) nas suas novelas "orientalizantes", num tom onde predominam o claro-escuro e o labiríntico. Entre essas ideias encontram-se: a importância do acaso na história, a supremacia ariana, bem como a oposição entre os pretensos modelos europeu e chinês de economia e sociedade. Distanciando-se das posições supostamente eruditas de Martins, Eça permite-se expressar a sua simpatia pelo conjunto da experiência humana. Do seu ponto de vista, a realidade social suscitadora de maiores dificuldades de identificação terá de facto sido... a portuguesa.

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The excerpts quoted originally written in idioms other than English are all, safe explicit mention, my own translation.

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Palavras-chave

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1. Introduction

Hence, the famous question on the morality or the [im]morality of realistic novels proves such a

famous bore. Psychological studies are neither moral nor immoral, they are simply amoral. Is anatomy

moral or immoral? Is the history of a corrupt society moral or immoral? Nobody would give Suetonius

to his daughters to read and hence my own daughters, if I were to have them, would also be reading

neither Balzac, nor Zola, nor Augier, nor Dumas, nor Daudet, nor Eça de Queirós, despite him being

one of my very best friends.

(Oliveira Martins, Literatura Italiana (Italian Literature), in Literatura e Filosofia (Literature and

Philosophy), pp. 400-1)

Oh, the invasion of books in 202! (...) In that erudite nave, where only the tallest reaches of the

windows had been left uncovered, free of some towering stack of books, you would calmly assume that

the dusk of autumn was advancing while outside June was in full blossom. The Library spilled over

and out of everything in 202! You could not open a chest without encountering another loose stack of

books! You could not lift the corner of a curtain without there all of a sudden appearing another pile

of books! And immense was my indignation when, one morning, I dashed urgently along, with my

pants in my hands, and found my way to the Water-Closet barred by a tremendous collection of Social

Studies right by the doorway!

Still more bitterly do I recall one historical night when, in my room, weary and worn from a walk to

Versailles, with my eyelids heavy and on the verge of slumbering, I had to shift from my place of rest,

swearing roundly, a simply horrendous thirty-seven Dictionary of Industry! Straightening with

punches the pillows, I cursed the press, human prolixity...

(Eça de Queirós, A Cidade e as Serras (The City and the Mountains), pp. 67-8)

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Recognisably close friends and both belonging to what became known as the 1870s Generation, between the works of Joaquim Pedro de Oliveira Martins (1845-94) and of José Maria Eça de Queirós (1845-1900) there are undoubtedly the most highly varied displays of affinity and mutually reciprocal influences. Meanwhile, no less worthy of mention, although tending to pass unnoticed by commentators, are the elements of ironic distancing, where not openly mocking, that the latter novel writer knew how to add, exclusively of his own working, to the ideas conveyed by his polymath (social philosopher, economist, historian and sociologist) friend.

The purpose here is to draw attention to this other aspect of the complex problematic of their intellectual interchanges and to this end assuming three core factors. Firstly, this is a question of importance to various factors within the framework of what may be termed Martins' philosophy of history. This holds especially for the case of race and chance and on which the stance he defended was drawn upon by Eça de Queirós and incorporated into the structure of his novel *A Relíquia* (*The Relic*) in a simultaneously sceptical and comic fashion. Martins' idea of a clash between Greek and Oriental civilisations, which furthermore he referred to the idea of the "untimely" meeting of diverse "series" of events, in accordance with the teachings of Cournot, is then taken up in his own way by Eça. The latter works this idea in a tone which combines the labyrinth and the *chiaroscuro* of the Baroque with the most vulgar of interpretations of Goethe — everything bound up in a healthy scepticism towards academic grandiloquence, especially the one associated with an aura of Germanic origins or influences, which Martins, and on more than one occasion, had applied so much dedication to pretending to personify in the Portuguese milieu.

Secondly, we intend to highlight the very special role that Chinese culture, or at least a certain image of this civilisation, played in the historical-philosophical lucubration of Martins and referring on the one hand to economic theories of Martins on issues such as protectionism and colonisation and on the other to the novel by Queirós, *O Mandarim (The Mandarin)*. According to Joaquim Pedro, there were two potential models for society, one peaceful and economic, illustrated by China, the other bellicose, "chrematistic", (self-)destructive, of which European countries, in particular England, or Britain, would be examples. In any clash between the two, victory would go to the Europeans although it remained to be seen whether they would be transformed into the equivalents of their victims and in what sense and to what exact

extent might such a train of events take place. As we shall return to, while Martins was a steadfast and utterly committed defender of imperialist theses founded upon ideas of white or "Aryan" supremacy, Eça made a point of maintaining an attitude that we may define as both ambiguous and non-judgemental. Within this scope, multiple literary references permeated (Goethe's *Faust* representing only the most obvious) rendering unmistakeable features profoundly interwoven and underground linking that which his friend diagnosed as the "Chinese question" and what we analogously may perhaps refer to as the "Portuguese question".

Finally, we should notice that this demarche by Eça, though susceptible to being interpreted as a genuine expression of universal humanism, somewhat confused but unbreakable desire to identify the "We" existing deep below the so much more distant and exotic "Other", may unfortunately also be perceived as a signal of its opposite: the internal exile and alienation of the leading Portuguese intellectual circles of the late 19th century vis-à-vis their own country, and in accordance with a model of self-reflection structured around references to otherness, which is known today to characterise the mental ambience of countries categorised as *underdeveloped* or *dependent*.

2. Oliveira Martins and History

2.1. Counter Enlightenment

In what we may consider the first instance of his discourse on history, Oliveira Martins above all seeks to question the very meaningfulness of any knowledge reporting on this subject. He builds his argument simultaneously: a) on the immense vastness of the material, based upon which only inductive approaches would prove feasible, that is, upon the history of all the peoples who have ever existed; b) on the intrinsic difficulties to the subject under study, the human species in its entire extent, endowed with the capacity of reflection and consciousness, hence truly rational while nevertheless still conditioned by an entire set of causal "series" that logically and chronologically predate it and correspondingly and necessarily raise its level of complexity (cf. passim Martins 1957 II: 3-11; 1985: 5-8).

Furthermore, within the same line of argument he similarly sustains that conceptions of history as progress, characteristic of Enlightenment thinking, prove fundamentally unacceptable. In particular, the notion of history as an empire of reason, in the fashion of Hegel, represents no more than the secularisation of the mental schema set out by Bossuet — and instead actually conveying some of the myths deemed characteristic of certain peoples, the Aryans, while nevertheless bearing a valid core when referring exclusively to the latter. The only acceptable notion of progress within this rationale would be that referring to an awareness of the inevitability of a certain outcome and determined by factors beyond rational human control. History, according to Joaquim Pedro, would actually very likely not represent progress: in fact, the only notion of progress present in his works is mere tautology, since man "progresses" in the sense of simply moving forwards and cannot but move forwards. However, such movement occurs strictly according to a logic inscribed in the nature of things, just as a river flows along in accordance with the characteristics of its bed. In any case, the key fact here is that we are not dealing with any sense of positive selfdetermination, at best only a conscious and resigned, and for this reason heroic acceptance of destiny (cf. idem 1985: 5; 1955: 238, 240-1; 1921 I: 60-1)¹.

At a later stage, however, Martins believes himself able to identify a certain number of features valid to all "human hives" ["colmeias humanas": human beehives] — and, correspondingly, extendable to become a certain type of theory of history —, yet still limiting his scope to Vico's well-known proposal as to a tripartite cycle to the existence of every society: the divine, heroic and human phases. However, this same theme, supposedly reporting on all societies, in fact goes beyond the limits of what may appropriately be referred to as *history* and falling instead within the framework of what Martins insisted on designating *nomology*. This thus configures a type of study

¹ Just as Martins writes, clearly targeting the core of Enlightenment thought while simultaneously seeking to salvage a certain version of Hegel corresponding to the more conservative interpretation of his philosophy, or the reading thus endowing the famously resigned and tardy wisdom:

[&]quot;The finality of history (departing for a moment from the scientific terrain) cannot in our opinion be found either in the designs of any phenomenally active Providence, nor in the principle of an undetermined and undefined Progress; even while unable to conceive of the world other than a being in motion and due to such motion, progresses; and for this same reason while progressing executes a providential action. Progress, nevertheless, without either determination or destiny, is as inconceivable as attributing a providential end to an ultra-terrestrial existence. The full existence of beings is the principle of their creation; and hence the manifestation of the Spirit aware in its own plenitude is the principle of the world and the finality of history" (Martins 1985: 5).

seeking to detect the necessary general laws but experiencing in this objective a double limitation: from the outset precisely due to the fact of approaching something that is not the specifically human to human societies, or their self-awareness and liberty; and besides, also consequent of the very generality, which necessarily impoverishes the comprehension/density of any particular case. The truly noble facet to studying diverse societies thus could not derive from their shared and common facets inscribed into their very biological definition but rather out of necessity refers to their very differences (cf. idem: 1957 II: 6):

"(...) thus are, and like hives, human societies successively dispersed across the earth. Their particular organic development obeys a typology that inherently contains various forms and has in its whole only that natural unity that in fact proves we do make up a common species. This is what attributes constancy to the social-human typology, just as among all the bees in their hives. (...) A hive is always only ever equal to itself and not all human societies even manage to resemble each other: some achieve more lofty and advanced states while others stumble and perish at stages well below an ideal type. (...) As human variety is so diversely gifted, the level or moment of the type's achievement is diverse across all the different human hives; and as are the conditions of their continued establishment on the earth also varying with such diversity also providing their fortune to the extent of their greater or lesser adaptation to a place, or *environment*" (Martins 1957 II: 5-6)².

This group of founding assumptions may operate as a major source of reservations on behalf of Joaquim Pedro regarding any attempt to construct a theory of history that would be even remotely Enlightenment inspired. History, according to this Portuguese polymath, *is not* universal reason. From the outset, that stems from the very motive that men are not universally endowed in the same way or to the same extent. That which is actually common to all also proves highly dissatisfactory precisely for defining that which distinguishes the best: we are here faced by what may

² According to Martins, and furthermore in a tone owing more to Vico than Herder, the society that best illustrates this very human "type" — "type" of the whole of the species, it should be noted and not "type" of each society —, the "hive" in whose history the potentials of the species are represented in their fullest and most finely developed form, is Roman society: "(...) as with some zoologist who, on wishing to study the habits of the bees has to choose the perfect and most typical hive, in the same way a nomologist, in wishing to study the organic development of human society choose a perfect and typical example. That example is Rome" (idem: 36).

best be called the *poverty of nomology*. Furthermore, and beyond the differences in the gifts bestowed on each group, there are also the prevailing environmental factors and, naturally, the enormous weighting of randomness. All of this must render impossible any form of learning that seeks to set itself forth as a science of history, even should the extent of our erudition become massively greater than that which it actually is:

"We should observe, before moving any further along, just how this current expression, the *science of history*, is addictively destructive and how it sponsors the confusion of ideas to this end. Science and history are mutually exclusive terms: history is narrative, science is preceptive; one tells, the other systematises. All the real sciences have a narrative or historical dimension; and what we commonly call *history* would thus be this narrative or historical part that expounds the laws on the dynamism of human societies considered within its systematic set — a science impossible to build due to the limits of our own intellectual capacities, in accordance with what we have been saying. We may gather and collect, as if some type of repository, the known historical vanities of the different human societies; but we cannot reduce all these histories into one systematic whole. In the same way, the zoologist seeking to draft a catalogue or index for all the hives successively in existence on earth, registering the history behind the founding and destruction of each one, would reach the conclusion that in this archive of facts no rule governed other than the constancy of the organic type determined by specific characteristics. Indeed, a similar amount has happened to humanity" (idem: 8-9)³.

If the forte of generality is not rationality, therefore not genuine liberty, the set of determinations to which "human hives" are hence subject to makes them border upon, to a greater or lesser extent, merely biological realities. While ethnology and nomology are distinct from the science of biology, and also correspondingly more complex, the *melior pars* of the study of human realities is in no way restricted to these fields of learning — rather it resides in history, of course, which serves par excellence for historical biography:

³ Martins continues, highlighting how among the foreseeable trajectories of the history of each hive, there may or may not be contacts, with these mutual shocks being precisely the key factor in the enrichment of the subject but also a sufficient cause for definitively ruling out that *science of history*. This interchange of trajectories is also, he clarifies, "what happens to human hives" (idem: 9).

"(...) [i]n the conscious and voluntary incarnations of history, there is a type of third level; there, the historian should strive to «seek out the characters and the biographies», the guiding thread that binds together the diverse eras. Indeed, it is this level, ideally exemplified by the «great men», that history best portrays as drama" (Catroga 1996: 124).

Finally, and in sum, it is within this context of disappointment with general trends that takes on clear meaning within the thesis of Martins maintaining that all societies obey the tripartite evolutionary principle first proposed by Vico. This evolutionary logic is handled by the Portuguese *literato* as tending to impoverish them all, driving the loss of "poetry" and creativity, thereby "petrifying" them to a certain extent. These ideas furthermore display, in addition to Vico, the influence of Cournot (to which we return). Joaquim Pedro even goes so far as to affirm that, departing from anonymity and the absence of drama, this tendency would drive "human hives" into returning to... anonymity and the lack of drama, as indeed has already happened to the Chinese and shall perhaps necessarily occur to all of humanity (cf. Martins 1957 II: 2-3, 16).

To sum up, we would once again highlight how the negation of the very feasibility of any universal theory of history claiming to have phenomenal relevance proves above all to Martins as an instrument for opposing Enlightenment's notion of history as progress; as a manifestation of rationality and self-determination according to some framework endowed with universal validity.

2. 2. The Aryan Question

Saying that history *is not* universal reason does not nevertheless mean that Martins excludes this search for rationality to potentially constituting a motive for *some* human groups. However, he makes an absolute and deliberate point of highlighting precisely that this is an issue for only some groups and groups that were ethnically determined as groups par excellence carrying the *meaning of history*, so to speak. Clearly, we refer here to the often mentioned Aryans. Without direct reference to this openly assumed facet of "Aryanism", Martins' considerations relative to the theory of history in fact do become fundamentally incomprehensible.

Indeed, it is interesting to note how, in a position that at first sight might be seen as a *politically correct* inspired tirade, Martins at one point accuses the earlier thinkers in the philosophy of history of abusive extrapolation based only upon the European experience. Hence, he writes in opposition to these allegedly illegitimate generalisations, "The systems of *universal history*, thus, summarise the world to a tiny slice of its lands, and humanity to the Europeans" (idem: 11). However, shortly after this outburst of apparent ambiguity, the same Martins took an occasion to make clear, that in accordance with his own point of view, an openly assumed Eurocentric and "filo-Aryan" perspective is the only feasible foundation for an appropriate understanding of the realities prevailing. He correspondingly clarifies:

"Therefore, what has erroneously been termed «universal history» is not and will never be more than a history of the campaigns and the successive Aryan victories ever since setting foot in Europe through to conquering almost all of Asia, part of Africa and the full extent of the Americas and Oceania. There you have the genuine universal history, that is, the history of the progress of a people in the homogenous development of their culture, in the growing expansion in their numbers and the lands subject to their rule. Given this, just what interest do the particular histories of the Americans, the Malays or the Africans hold when you know or you esteem that the final destiny of the world is to fall to the Aryan empire? For this reason, the histories of non-Aryan peoples only interest us and are only worthy of our attention when chance throws any one of them into contact with this sovereign civilisation that shall certainly subject or exterminate them" (idem: 11-2).

Still furthermore, just a few pages later, he states:

"The universal historical system thus lies in the epic development of the all conquering advance of the Aryans, rendering subject or exterminating all hives or human society and thus wiping out all human varieties. The Aryan is the most completely endowed — especially in the preeminent faculty for assimilation that is, as we have seen, equivalent to victory. Unsusceptible of conversion, the Semite sat on the steps of his dead and destroyed temple, weeping his misery; silently, the Hamite disappeared into his muteness; the vital competitiveness of these peoples stilled, the Aryan would reign universally were there not still five hundred million Chinese — a third of the world's population, occupying a blessed region in the central point of the earth" (idem: 14-5).

Consequently, the preceding theories on universal history, having failed to appropriately take into consideration the "zoological law of selection" (idem: 11) — according to which in each group of societies "the best endowed in all respects ends up subduing its neighbours, either by assimilation or destruction, and replacing them" (idem: 11) — would thus have committed an error but only inasmuch they had ingenuously attributed excessive worth to human groups who did not reach such standards given they were exclusive to Aryans. We ought to notice that the meaning of his criticism of the earlier frameworks, and taking their supposed Eurocentrism into account, is exactly the opposite of what we are nowadays commonly used to hearing when this theme is raised.

In *O Helenismo e a Civilização Cristã* (Hellenism and Christian Civilisation), Martins enters into deeper discussion of that which seems to have represented for him the core issue of Aryan uniqueness. He explicitly defends how the Oriental (Semite, Egyptian or other) learns from Job to accept Destiny as an omnipotent even when unjust personal will, that is indeed no more than the sublimated expression of the political reality of despotic "Asian" monarchies, whereas simultaneously the Greeks rise up with Prometheus against injustice and can only recognise divine omnipotence as an inherent expression of the very law of the Cosmos. This double standard or this antinomy between what is assumed to be Greek and what is deemed Oriental became of course a recurrent theme in imperialistic historiography concerning eastern Mediterranean societies. In 1928, W. S. Ferguson put forward considerations referring to royal cults in Hellenistic monarchies, more exactly under the Ptolemy, and precisely in order to oppose Greek and Egyptian types of devotion to the common sovereign:

"(...) the two cults were distinct. They were different in ritual and priestly personnel. They were different in consequences, in that, whereas Pharaoh dropped out of the ritual when dead, the Theoi Adelphoi did not. And they were also different in idea: Pharaoh was not law incarnate (...) like the Hellenistic god-king; he was rather the apotheosis of *Life* — the Osiris of the living. The one common factor of the two cults was the god Ptolemy, a single symbol for two very different aspirations of two very different people — of the Egyptians for life after death, and of the Greeks for government according to law. The religion of the Egyptians, as it was presented authoritatively to the *Greek* world by Ptolemy I, centred, not in Pharaoh, but in

Serapis; and if Greeks who felt the need sought help at the native shrines, that was their affair." (Ferguson 1975 [1928]: 145).

The Aryan is thus spontaneously pantheist and defender of Justice: he does learn to accept, but only the law inherent to the divinised essence of Nature and not to any other personal wish. Meanwhile, the aforementioned uprising would have brought nothing positive apart from the learning of its very uselessness: it is in this learning, and only within this learning, that resides the heroism of Prometheus (cf. passim Martins 1985: 60-4, 88 and aft.; 1955: 302-5, 308). It is worth noticing that this conception of the uniqueness of the Aryans in the Martinian perspective, his group of variations on the theme of Prometheus, enables a more direct relationship to be established both with his notion of progress (the relentless march) and with the most conservative of the interpretations of Hegel, that is, the renowned post festum knowledge that brings nothing positive apart from the heroism (or whatever may pass as such) of a resigned and aware acceptance of inevitability⁴. We should meanwhile also register that at various points Martins corrects Hegel, even the Hegel of this more conservative reading and in a sense that seems to welcome the criticisms made on the Hegelian pantheism by the current of thinking of Karl Krause and his disciples. According to these, Hegelianism would need to be corrected in a panentheist sense and therefore able to recognise the universal principle of individuality and differentiation, in a Leibnizian fashion. Panentheism sustains that just as God is not beyond the world (or parted from the world), nor is He reducible to the actual world. This purpose is clearly present in the section when Martins writes, within the framework of one his countless elegies to the Spartans:

"Nevertheless, beyond the Olympians, humanised to a greater or lesser extent, the Dorian imagination had perceived God, unity, spirit, and universal order. This neither opposes nor secedes from the world, but rather exists within and involves it (...). Nevertheless, what especially and above all characterises it are not any naturalist attributes, what stands out

⁴ It is worth noting from the outset that clear indications of these Martinian positions can easily be found in the writings of Eça. Among other passages, and in truly exemplary fashion, there is the well known episode of the "Ega's atom" in *Os Maias*, where two characteristics traditionally perceived as divine are repeatedly attributed to the aforementioned "atom," omnipresence and omniscience — but, and highly significant, not the third one, omnipotence (cf. Queirós 2000b I: 84).

greatest is its psychological nature. This is the absolute good and which rules everything (...). It is neither the God of the pantheists, observes Bunzen [sic, indeed Christian von Bunsen or more likely Ernst von Bunsen], nor the one of Judaizers; it is God acting as a spirit, which is neither beyond this world nor absorbed up into it" (Martins 1955: 299-300).

Hence, and again according to Martins, while all the ethnic groups mentioned recognized Moira or Destiny as an omnipotent reality, above the very gods themselves, this acceptance meant substantially different things in accordance with whether one was considering Aryans or Orientals. Joaquim Pedro sets about unravelling just what facets to the worship of Moira may or may not be perceived as genuinely Hellenic and/or Oriental. However, his opinion carries him towards an almost exclusive valuation of the aforementioned differences and blatantly praising the "noble" features, referring to the Hellenes, while simultaneously denigrating those "submissive" characteristics attributed to Semites and other Orientals. Within this same line of argument, he also puts down as Oriental importations the facets of "orgiasticism" allegedly present in various Greek religious practices as well as the very fundamental notions associated with the figure of Socrates (cf. for instance Martins 1955: 286, 290). As regards Christianism, he hesitates in matters of labelling it as an expression of Orientalising influences:

"Among the religions arriving from the Orient, one came that, within all others, was the best. Combining its fantastic spiritualism with naturalist symbolism, Christianism satisfied, at one time, the mystical demands of Socratic salvific wizards ["taumaturgos"] and the orginatic derangements of orientalised plebes" (idem: 306).

However, he ended up by considering it above all a product of Aryan capacity to assimilate and incorporate foreign features and in this sense another instrument favouring their triumph:

"(...) finally, Christianism itself, invented out of the hallucinations of a heroic and ruined people, the messianic crying of a crushed nation, that spreading through Egypt aggregated to the clamour of its laments the dogma of ultra-life, on entering into contact with Hellenism seems to have overwhelmed it when, on the contrary, it is the European genius to

transform it by introducing itself into its scope and ensuring that predominant in this new religion of Semite origin are Hellenist idealist spiritualism and Roman juristic ritualism" (Martins 1957 II: 13).

Relative to the Hellenic group responsible for cultural importations, this above all refers to the Athenians, or the Ionians in general, who he considers to have been some type of *Parisians* of classical Greece — "(...) Indeed, these are the future Athenians of the century of Pericles; as we might say the French of the century of Louis XIV" (Martins 1955: 291) — volatile, adaptable and transformative, and not the Spartans, or the Dorians, the purest representative of the Greek type and the true depository of genius in this human group. As the purest of the Greeks, the Dorians would also be the first finished representatives of the Aryans and, in this sense, of the very human species itself:

"The Spartan is the first race in History to prove a humanly superior type that, above the idiosyncrasies of the race and the naturalist influences of any species, is according to all criteria the abstract prototype, and as if the sun of the human society planetary system, around which all others rotate and which attracts and illuminates all others. The Spartan is a type of human intrepidness, of the heroism of action, the religion of duty, the feeling of Order that, transferred from the luminous regions of conscience, he seeks ingenuously and holily to establish in the positive terrain of fact. In history, the Spartan is the first in a series that were best and most able to encapsulate within themselves the God of force; he is the true precursor, the Baptist of the infinite mystery by means of which, in time, occurred the incarnation of God, not in one man but instead in the immense soul of humanity" (Martins 1955: 292-3)⁵.

Within the context of this fundamental opposition of attitudes towards Destiny, we would also note how the very differences between monotheism and polytheism are

⁵ Meanwhile, just as Martins made no bones about his predilection for the "pure" Spartans, he did make a point of simultaneously noting that, in his opinion, the future lay more probably with the side of the "bastardised" Athenians given how the evolutionary laws precisely favoured such average types (cf. in general Martins 1955: 284-95). This tone of consideration and regret is in line with the concerns displayed by a huge range of late 19th century authors as regards the probability of a "selection of the less fit" (Shipman 1994: 97 and after; see also Gould 2004) as a consequence of the renowned hypertrophy of the central zone of the "Bell Curve" proposed by Francis Galton. In general, authors of this period displaying a more pro-aristocracy attitude have anguished at great length over this problem of the supposed triumph of *mediocracy*.

stripped of any relevance (cf. Martins 1985: 60-1; 1955: 297) — which may well be understood given that the merits of the former would, as might already be guessed, tend to be attributed to the very group that he was intent on downplaying, the Orientals. As a matter of fact, Martins' vision of Ancient Greece qua specifically "Aryan", "European" or "Indo-European", and as precisely the opposite of everything suggesting the "the East", corresponds very much to what was to become the central target of Martin Bernal's renowned book on Black Athena (1991), the huge polemic induced by this work clearly suggesting how much these are, still nowadays, sensitive discussions, since they directly address the very core of "European" or "Western" mythical genealogies. In Martins' days, however, "Greece" was particularly associated with "Germany" or Kultur — and as opposed to "France" suggesting "Rome" or Civilisation. Although he generally kept a relatively broad notion of what he meant by the "Aryans", it is also relatively clearly that Martins' exalted eulogies of "Hellas" very much followed the German-leaning preferences of at least one of his phases. (For a global exposition of this group of subjects, with "Greece" being chosen as mythical ancestor for "Germany" within late XIXth century German milieu, but having to compete with other references, namely Teutonic and Christian ones, see Losurdo 2002: 5-78, 137-192).

An entire set of influences on the thinking of Martins would really now need to be taken into closer detailed consideration, namely those usually categorised as germanising that may well have led to his celebrated "pessimism" and the famous worship of heroes referred to above. However, here our objective is to summarise and impose a provisional order so as to be able to move onto another critical contribution to his mental framework, that made by Cournot. Correspondingly, according to Martins, each society tends towards its own "ideal type", certainly different to the others, hierarchically situated in accordance with them and susceptible to research interests exactly seeking to highlight the differences (Herder). However, they may all be referred to an overarching "ideal type" defining the range of humanity, thereby correspondingly obeying a tripartite principle of evolution that he draws from poetry and creativity towards prose and disillusionment (Vico). The latter may clearly be considered a triumph for immanence and liberty as an expression of complete self-awareness and the acceptance of necessity (Hegel, Hartmann), notwithstanding the fact that this rational only holds, assuming that it does, to peoples somehow carrying the

meaning of history, thus the Aryans. In any case, the outcome of evolution might simply culminate in a simple and resigned acceptance, which not even omniscience in the Hegelian fashion is able to console, since it now only strives to dispassionately unravel the world of illusion and annihilate one's own very will to knowledge (Schopenhauer, Buddhism). Against this whirlwind of self-annihilation perhaps only the cult of heroes might stand firm (Carlyle), with this latter fed by the very imperative of existing alongside an omnipotent Destiny, whether conceived as Chance or Necessity, horse-riding (or tiger-riding) it via a simultaneously astute and happy will, in the manner of his contemporary Nietzsche). In any case, if hope does exist of overcoming the drift towards petrification and the loss of vitality in social evolution, this is where it lies⁶.

2. 3. The Cournot case

Additionally, and as aforementioned, there is another decisive influence on the overall configuration of Martins' mental framework requiring a conclusive and separate approach. We have already seen that, according to this thinker, the route taken by human societies tends to head towards petrification and in obedience of patterns of behaviour that overwhelm all heroicness, thereby also eliminating all subjectivity even when this fact brings with it a certain number of advantageous aspects. This beam of ideas is perhaps sufficient to enable defence of the thesis that Martinian lucubration deserves being collated with that of another economist and social philosopher, the French writer Antoine Augustin Cournot — and furthermore that is rather justified given how Martins himself explicitly and emphatically recognised his debt to the former (cf. for instance Martins 1921 II: 264, 288; 1955: 239-41).

The theme that above all unites the two philosophers is clearly the importance of chance. Nevertheless, even out of its relationship with that of Cournot, Martins' thought reports a certain number of specific features that need highlighting. We should

⁶ Regarding the authors here referred to, see particularly Herder (1995) and Nietzsche (n.d.). In the purest form of this story, Destiny is of course to be taken as Necessity and accepted and loved as such (amor fati). As to the importance of lucubration referring to national "destiny" (Schicksal, Geschick) within the context of German "ideology of war" or Kriegsideologie in 1914-18, see especially Losurdo 2001. This is clearly an important turning of the century intellectual trend, which of course does not refer strictly to Germany and within which Martins ideas have to be contextualized.

clarify that the idea of chance in Cournot represents an attempt at integrating this issue into an explanatory determinist-based framework. According to the French thinker, reality should be susceptible to reduction to knowledge on specific causal nexuses, all necessary and explaining "series" of events while also simultaneously proposing the case of the possibility of an "untimely encounter" of two or more causal series occurring (cf. Cournot 1912: 36 and aft.; 1922: 67, § 59; 1973: 9-10). This means that a non-necessary and random factor was recognised as to a certain extent overlapping, thereby adding to the core scheme, with this being a rigorously determinist one. In fair truth, it must be said that the ideas of Cournot are open to a rigorously deterministic reading but within the scope of a Providence whose purpose stretches beyond our understanding. In *Considerations*, immediately after having defined the very notion of chance, he writes:

"The natural fact thereby established or proven consists of the mutual *independence* of the various series of causes and effects that concur *accidentally* to produce such phenomena, to result in such encounters, to determine such and such an event, for which reason this is designated as *fortuitous*; and this independence of the various respective chains does not in any way exclude the idea of a suspension common to all chains with the primordial linkage, above the limits, or even beneath the limits that our rationality and our observations may ever attain. The fact that Nature ceaselessly agitates the dice cup of chance, and this other, that the continuous interchange of the chains of conditions and secondary causes, independent of each other, perpetually results in that which we term probabilities or fortuitous combinations, does not mean that God has not one or the others in His hand and cannot ensure that they do not all derive from His same initial decree. There is no less respect for God in studying the laws of chance (given that even chance has its laws and proven by a multiplicity of evidence), than studying the laws of astronomy or physics" (Cournot 1973: 9-10).

The one thing to underwritten, though, is that Cournot attached to these ideas the suggestion that the random aspects were of decreasing importance. Within his mental framework, the importance of these untimely encounters of diverse series would begin to decline as from a determined moment in human history, pointing towards a future within which, in statistical terms, should display a perfect compensation between the respective influences. In fact, in his depiction of the

randomness Cournot integrated both the facets of causal chain diversity and the respective statistical compensations. Expressed alternatively, chance itself, while endowed with undeniable importance in terms of knowledge on specific situations, would tend to lose relevance in handling large aggregations given the very reciprocal annulment of their effects (cf. 1973: 10).

More exactly, in keeping with this view that chance would be of declining importance over the *longue durée*, core responsibilities in the evolution were attributed to two interrelated factors. From the outset, this would stem from the ever greater weighting of economic factors in social existence, which, leading to a growing civilisation of habits, proves to be a factor in reducing the unforeseen and the unforeseeable. However, another element also playing an important role is the increasing scale of processes, which would drive the aforementioned compensations — hence, the famous "law of large numbers":

"In the facts of the details that are the usual objects of statistics, and where the proofs of the same chance are counted from the thousands to the millions, the effect of the accumulation of evidence is operated in compensation for all of the fortuitous, accidental causes, instead setting in relief the action of other causes, however weak these may prove, whose permanent influence relates to the conditions essential to the production of the phenomenon, on the long term prevailing over the more energetic, but fortuitous and irregular causes" (Cournot 1973: 10).

Indeed, it is worth highlighting how much the characteristic *forma mentis* of the economist is clearly perceivable in the historical reasoning of Cournot: notice how a multitude of independent decisions, which any effort to control administratively would prove in vain, nevertheless spontaneously produces combined forms in accordance with patterns generally susceptible to forecasting. We would similarly recall how, as regards several of these aspects, Cournot expounded extensively, even while subjecting them to critical reformulation, on typical Enlightenment themes: on the one hand, he completed and corrected Hume and Laplace on the issue of determinism while also safeguarding a good part of their perspectives.⁷ Furthermore,

⁷ At certain points, Cournot is more peremptory in his affirmation of an intrinsically indeterminate side to reality itself, even as regards an omniscient consciousness: "It is not therefore accurate to say,

he does to a good deal accomplish Enlightenment expectations as to the consequences of the civilising and stabilising role of the economy and *doux commerce*.

Meanwhile, it is no less true that within the overall extent of his vision the outcome above all reflects a melancholic attitude regarding this intended historical evolutionary process. The fact remains that the grandiosity and heroism are thereby smothered out of social existence leaving the latter more mundane: without excessive casualties to be sure, but unfortunately without the peaks of praiseworthy and grandeur that had hitherto been enabled by the unpredictable, exceptionality and drama, which represent the very sources of historical interest in itself. In truth, there is an unavoidable dark side to Cournot's diagnostic resulting from his perception that the last men, according to all foreseeable, would somehow be less than men and that the final post-historical society towards which we were heading was something less than human society "tending to take on, as a beehive, almost geometrical patterns, of which experience reveals and theory demonstrates the essential conditions" (Cournot 1922: 607, § 541).

In fact, according to this French economist, the range of society life cycle was necessarily played out over three phases, of which only the second would be worth genuine historical interest. Hence, we may say that this somehow reveals in its approach (even if against the declared intentions of the economist) the reasoning correspondent to the fundamental framework of Vico's tripartite evolution, leading

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as Hume does, that «chance is no more than the ignorance that we face as regards the true causes», or, as Laplace holds, that «probability is relative in part to our knowledge and in part to our ignorance», to such an extent that for a higher intelligence capable of knowing how to unravel all the causes and follow them through all their effects, the science of mathematical probability would be rendered meaningless due to a lack of object" (1912: 46, § 36). If this intelligence were to exist, Cournot insists, it would only differ to ours in the extent that it made less error in separating the fortuitous from the necessary, which would nevertheless continue to exist as distinct realities: "It would not be disposed to considering as independent series that really bear influence over each other, or, on the contrary, to represent bonds of solidarity between series that are actually independent" (idem: 46). Meanwhile, shortly afterwards, Cournot was already accepting the eventuality of such an omniscient consciousness according to which nothing would appear as random with everything rigorously determined, while nevertheless adding that what is obtainable via the science of chance would generate the same results, at least when averaged out: "It is true to state in this sense (as is so commonly repeated) that chance governs the world, or better expressed, that it plays a role, and a indeed notable role, in governing the world; which does not at all repudiate the idea that this should be done according to some supreme and providential direction: whether one presumes that this providential direction relates only to the average and general results that the very laws of chance have as their purpose producing, or whether that same supreme intelligence sets out the details and the particular facts for coordinating them according to visions that extend beyond our sciences and our theories" (idem: 47).

from poetry to disillusionment and with the actual historical intermediate period associated to the moment of heroism. As to the "extreme" phases, whether the infantile or the mature (or indeed senile), these may in some way be considered especially from their common characteristic, that is the predominance of anonymity:

"Regarding the remainder, the dramatic interest of history, it is necessary on the one hand that the aforementioned interest lies not with fabulous personalities as those of primitive times, which the critics of our era see as the personification of a race or a caste, nor with these collective entities that, in the modern style are termed the masses, but with real personalities and real names. On the other hand, it is necessary that Fortune performs or seems to perform the main role at the core of the intrigue and its unrolling. In fact, it is between these two extremes in the development of society that greater men of all types, conquerors, legislators, missionaries, artists, the wise, philosophers, are in their greatest ascendance over their centuries; and the strokes of Fortune similarly have the greatest impact and repercussions as their power is not contained to the same extent neither by the primitive instincts of Nature and a need that we may define as vital or organic, nor by another need whose principle is more abstract but whose power is no less and that we may call physical or economic as that which finally determines (...) the life of societies, repressing each by another the many individual instincts. Consequently, just as how societies survived even before living the life of history, so they are perceived now while not exactly attaining but at least tending towards a state in which history would be summarised by the official gazette, serving as a register for the rules and regulations and the statistical surveys, the accession of heads of state and the nominations to position of state and would therefore cease to be a history, in the sense normally attributed to this word" (idem: 607-8; § 542).

To cap this field of *nomologic* and *petrifying* tendencies in the lives of still to come human "hives", there is an additional feature, indeed a factor of deception and bitterness. As a matter of fact, in this way Europe would be heading away from what had hitherto been the defining identifiers of its own development (whether "uniqueness" or "exceptionalism"), approximating another model of *civiltà* recognised by Cournot as corresponding to the fundamental core of Chinese history:

"The progressive civilisation under way involved the victory of general and rational principles over spontaneous life energies, bringing with it many drawbacks as well as

advantages: «in some aspects a lowering and in others aspects a perfecting of the conditions of humanity». The final state would be one in which «history, absorbed by the science of social economics, would end like some river whose waters disperse (to the benefit of the greatest number) into myriad irrigation channels, losing what was once their unity and imposing grandeur». The substitution of the world of gazette for that of the epic would bring well-being and security as well as anonymity and accidie. For if modernity was a creation of European development, what lay beyond it had been prefigured by the Asian experience (...). For centuries, Chinese civilisation had formed a parallel record to European, equal in achievements but distinct in values. Where Western societies had devoted themselves to the glorification of successive ideals — faith, fatherland, freedom — Chinese realism formed social institutions for the physical and moral improvement of individuals, the utility of men. It was in China, not in Europe, that principles of rational administration and industrial invention were pioneered which only prevailed much later in the West after the heroic energies of its properly historical phase had flowered and faded" (Anderson 1992: 302-3; the excerpt with the river and channel metaphor drawn from Cournot 1922: 609, § 543).

We now return, following this short detour through Cournot's thought, to setting out the ideas of Martins as regards history. Inspired by a different range of sources, as detailed above, they combined in an effort to summarise how three or four primordial factors determine the evolution of "human hives" (cf. Martins 1921 I: 54):

- a) From the very outset, race, given that each individual member is only able to strive to become an ideal type accordingly, an absolute maximum within which all individual potential is fulfilled. Such potentials obviously differ from case to case and range from "eventless societies", as in the case with a large number of African and other societies, before passing through various intermediary stages through to the special case of the Aryans, "the zenith (...) of ethnology" (idem: 72), thanks to whose mediation the "conscious spirit" might advance and stamp its full effects on the terrain of history;
- b) subsequently, progress, defined sometimes as resigned self-awareness; sometimes also in a merely tautological fashion and as such simply a march *forwards* and onwards inscribed into the nature of things, as with each river in its own river bed (idem: 5, 60-1); in still other cases as complexity and rising uncertainty, implied by the submission of the social to the various other preceding "series" (physical, chemical,

biological) (idem: 7-8). In this latter version, there is also an assumption of symmetrical hierarchies of generality and complexity: the facts specific to human societies are those that obtain their riches out of a relative uncertainty, which is a consequence of their lesser generality⁸;

- c) furthermore, the surrounding environment, that is, the geographic or *mesologic* conditioning, primarily perceived as a sign of the aforementioned subjection of the social by the "series" that inevitably predate society but that above all convey the wielding of influence by the last main factor, that is...
- d) ...chance, conceived explicitly in the fashion of Cournot. According to Martins, furthermore, at least according to some of his passages, it would be especially this latter factor that renders impossible the construction of a genuine theory of history, or a philosophy of universal history assumed to have relevance in phenomena. According to a slightly altered formulation, chance would be the key factor in differentiating between the true domains of actual history (its terrains par excellence) and the renowned nomology (the terrain of the general laws). Hence, each "human hive" would inevitably tend to head towards the purest type of its own self (or its Geist), within the framework of which each race would attain their respective absolute limits, except with exactly those cases, resulting from mesologic or other factors, in which the development of the various hives produces the fortuitous and untimely encounter of two or more of them. It is within the scope of this vision that Martins considers the meeting between Greek society with Oriental counterparts, which correspondingly involves identifying just to what exact extent who influenced who and in what kind of way. The general conviction of Joaquim Pedro is clear: the Aryans would end up submitting all other groups by extending their domination worldwide. However, within this process there are nuances to be considered, and Martins also accepted the argument first put forward by Galton according to which the predominant trend would be, overall, the production of a median type, resulting from the mixture of many and eventually optimising the adaptive capacity of all beings⁹.

⁸ This idea may well have been received from a certain variety of Comtean thought, very likely filtered through readings of Émile Boutroux.

⁹ As regards the issue of the relationships between Hellenism and Christian civilisation, the Martinian thesis is, as already seen, that the superior Hellenic civilisation prevailed and ended up overwhelming the Semite races. Hence, Christianism itself, seeming to reflect the predominance of the latter, ends up actually expressing, when properly understood, the victory of the Hellenic Aryans,

What is more, and should be highlighted here, is how fundamentally sensitive Martins was to the fact that Cournot's theses had reintroduced narrative into scientific discourse. Indeed, while the French thinker considers the overall importance of chance decreasing over the long term, his Portuguese peer found this line of reasoning to be at the very least doubtful, maintaining that such untimely encounters between the different series would rise in accordance with the rising complexity of the real and thereby constituting the quintessence of true history. Still furthermore, while Cournot approached the aforementioned trend towards petrification with a melancholic, even depreciative attitude given it inherently foretold of the loss of heroism and vitality, the position taken up by Martins is again susceptible to differentiation given he held the key destructive factor remained those untimely causalities, and petrification far less so — this clearly stands, despite his also perceiving in this latter facet an unquestionably negative value and something that, when all was said and done, might be impossible to avoid. Thus, considered across its full extent, the explicative framework put forward by Martins is significantly more catastrophic than that of the famous French economist¹⁰.

or a third equally Aryan term, the Germanic barbarians (cf. 1985: 14 and after; 1957 II: 13). Indeed, according to Martins, what was necessary in terms of the religious reforms required in his times was simply "the elimination of Oriental ideas in the heart of Christianism" (1985: 35). That would enable the emergence of a new type, which, being truly human, would also be an extension of the Ancient Greece type: "The modern times are heading towards the definition of a type that is neither Greek, nor Semite, nor Celtic, nor Germanic due to being classical, and Hellenism is the base of modern culture because Greece was the first civilisation to conceive the above all others classical idea of free men" (idem: 20).

Meanwhile, it should be repeated, this conviction as to the relative general order of superiority of the Aryans is attenuated by the other, the greater capacity for survival of particularly adaptable and transformable groups (in the Greek case, the Athenians), which would end up nurturing a generation of a mixed and universal type within which the worst features would disappear but within which would also be lost, in virtue of the same principle of the triumph of the average, the finest flowers of humanity.

10 This is well-expressed, for example, in his writing: "(...) it would seem to me that only through the intervention of chance, defended by Voltaire, we can explain the facts of paralysation and degeneration of societies; these [ab]normal facts, indeed, but not for this reason unreal, these facts so very much more numerous than those normally progressive" (Martins 1955: 239). We should note that, according to the Portuguese thinker, destruction results above all from exceptionalness, the somehow deviating fact, not only (or not so much as) from the petrifying normality. The living sense of the importance, sometimes decisive, of one or other fortuitous detail undoubtedly endows an intensely dramatic scale to Martins' view of history, to which, furthermore, he also explicitly incorporates the notion of the importance of leakages and discontinuities in the flow of time (cf. passim 1957 II: 21, 31-2).

Beyond having imported from Cournot the utilisation (in his case, actually all but obsessive) of the metaphors of the river course and the hive as resources deemed appropriate to translating the history of human societies, Martins also retained his emphasis on problems emerging from the relationships between the European and Chinese civilisations; and taking up a similar stance with his proposal of the possible *Sinizing* tendency to future evolution. Faced by the Aryans, it seemed true that nobody put up genuine resistance with all societies being either exterminated or rendered subject... — except for the Chinese? And the Aryans themselves, were they also now not subject to a process of growing *Sinization*?

3. Martins' History in the Stories of Eça: A Relíquia

3. 1. Forking Paths

We ought to immediately notice that in a certain sense, and in at least two of his works, Eça de Queirós takes a decisive step beyond to the framework of Martins set out above all the while parodying it to the greatest possible extent. We may even state that the narrative running through *A Relíquia* is fundamentally structured around a Martins based model endowed with its own Baroque, labyrinthine, almost Borgesian characteristics. In this novel, the two causal sequences are two paths that converge and thereby also necessarily fork. Clearly, this confluence/divergence (endowed with all symbolism associated with crossroads) may generate confusion and deceit: it is highly probable that in any particular moment and under certain circumstances, the features of each one of the series "jump" to the next, influencing chains of events that, from a logical point of view, should have absolutely nothing to do with each other 11.

At this stage, we should also emphasise that this cult of the very Baroque features is entirely compatible with his declared objective of recovering lost facets of *Hispanidad*, or Hispanic culture — which had been an important theme in the earliest

¹¹ There is an interesting reference by Jorge Luis Borges to Eça, and as regards one of his *fantastic* and *orientalising* novels even while the theme is actually *O Mandarim* (cf. Borges 1999: 465). In fact, *O Mandarim* shares in common with its sister novel *A Relíquia* this exploration of the theme of "inter-crossing" or the interaction of diverse causal series. Within this scope, events taking place in an obscure corner of Lisbon impact on events in far-distant China, somewhat similar to Eça wishing to suggest, in his own particular fashion, that the beating wings of a butterfly, as it is nowadays common to say, may cause a storm on the other side of the world.

works of Martins and would later, in a broader context, lead him to venerating "authenticity" and tradition, within the well-known pathway giving way to *integralismo*. In fact, we should recall, after initial fury at the pasts of Peninsula societies, in accordance with the renowned model of *Causas da Decadência dos Povos Peninsulares* (*Causes of the Decadence of the Peninsular Peoples*) by Antero de Quental, a significant proportion of the 70s Generation experienced a period of intense regret or *pentitismo* that led to the emphatic rehabilitation of that past within the scope of a general conception of history qua "master of life". As early as 1875, for example, Martins, undoubtedly one of the first to take up this neo-traditionalist trajectory, considered the Hispanic peoples to be particularly responsive to justice and to Proudhon's "Ideal" and hence peoples within which socialism would take root at an earlier stage as he made perfectly clear in the final section of *Os Povos Peninsulares e a Civilização Moderna* (*The Peninsular Peoples and Modern Civilisation*) (cf. Martins 1957 I: 239-46)¹².

Martins is, in any case, an almost constant presence throughout *A Relíquia*. There are almost explicit references to his ideas, for example, regarding the dream of Teodorico about a crucifix in chapter III, in which Judaic and Hellenic elements are

¹² As regards this facet of authenticity, simultaneously referring to Hispanic culture and to Portuguese culture as an exponent of the former, Martins, while still young, furthermore verifies certain features that, according to Zeev Sternhell, came to characterise the birth of fascist ideology: among others the substitution of the proletariat by the nation and the economic facets by the ideal aspects held by the former Socialist activists, now defeated and disillusioned with politics (cf. Sternhell, Sznajder and Ashéri 1995: 59-125; for a discussion of this facet to the thinking of Martins, but primarily taking his economic ideas into consideration, cf. also Graça 2002: 273-4). An example of this worship of Hispanic culture as a carrier of the Ideal, and hence tending towards the full sublimation or accomplishment of Life in a Good Death, emerge above all out of the various historical romances written by Martins, particularly A *Vida de Nun'Álvares*, whose last lines convey a "*Viva la Muerte!*" endowed with rare brilliancy:

[&]quot;Dying well: that has been the supreme wisdom of all times. Greek euthanasia was followed by cloistral suicide with the hope of an ultra-life replete with pious fortune; but the idea that we make today of death would seem more like the more distant (...). The certainty of transcendental reward shorn of the merit of abnegation; and in this sense, the end of Socrates is worth as much as all the saints; and perhaps the tragedy of Utica has more merit than all martyrdoms.

In modern times, nobody knew Life better than us, the peoples of Spain; that is, nobody expressed the energy and the will of humanity with such superiority. Nobody even knew how to die better than the people that has incarnated upon itself, paradoxically, the theory of Death in the bosom of the Eternal: this thinking, piercing as if the blade of a sword, unfolded and crossed the world in its roundness, and came to beg us in our hearts to bleed it out. Spain was the victim of an error of definition; and if one day men do align with the true theory of Life, nobody would even know how to die for such cause as the people among all others born to heroism" (Martins 1984: 315).

mixed to deliberately delirious, daydream-like effect. The main character, Teodorico, and his travel companion, the German academic Topsius, meet an ancient Greek:

"Topsius shouted at him: «Eh, rhapsode!» And when he, searching around in the heathers by the path, came up close — the learned historian asked him whether from the sweet islands in the sea he had brought any new song. The old man raised his saddened face; and very nobly murmured that an imperishable youthfulness smiled on the most ancient corners of Hellas. Then, having rested his sandal on top of a stone, he picked up the lyre in his slow hands; the child, to his right, with eyelashes lowered, raised a cane flute to his mouth; and in the splendour of the afternoon that enveloped Siam in a golden haze, the rhapsode let play an already tremulous song, but glorious and immersed in adoration, as had once been next to the altar in a temple, on an Ionian beach... And I understood that he sang to the gods, to their beauty and to their heroic activities. And the Delphi would speak, beardless and golden coloured, refining human thoughts to the rhythms of his cithara; Athena, armed and industrious, guiding the hands of men on their weavings; Zeus, ancestral and serene, endowing beauty on the races, order on the cities; and above them all, formless and sparse, Fate, stronger than all others!

However, suddenly a shout swept the heavens from the peak of the hill, supremely and delightfully as if a liberation! The old man's fingers fell silent between the metal strings; with his head bowed, the epic crown of laurel half-leafless, appearing to cry over his Hellenic lyre, forever thereafter plunged into long ages of silence and uselessness. And by his side, the child, taking the flute from his lips, raised to the black crosses his clear eyes — where rose the passion and curiosity of a new world" (Queirós 2000: 194-5).

The same Martinian preference scale in relation to the two cultures is also contained within the attitude subsequently taken by Teodorico: "And my piety was great when confronted by that rhapsody from the islands of Greece, also lost to that harsh city of the Jews, bound up in that sinister influence of an alien god! I gave him my very last silver coin" (idem: 196).

Nevertheless, we should repeat that this heavy presence of Martins is almost invariably presented through a filter of parody. The very result of the action of Fate *stronger than all others*, we would recall is, to a large extent, the central theme of history. This clearly refers to the (at least apparently) *casual and untimely encounters* of the two logical series corresponding to the greater relics and the lesser relics (or the

religious and those referring to sexual prowess), with the subsequent exchange of positions between some of these and the devastating consequences of this chance, random-like events to the destiny of the main character — which represents, as is commonly accepted, the very core of Queirós' narrative.

Eça, nevertheless, was clearly learned on the issues surrounding the fact that chance, here the apparent form assumed by Fate, indeed represented no more than another of the factors making up the explanative framework of Martins for the evolution of societies. The others lacked, in particular the "congenital capacities of race", the *élan vital* of Teodorico, which will finally enable him to, after every kind of setback, again stand proud and return to social intercourse, now through other means — or, taking the overall panorama into account, of more of the same, albeit in a slightly modified version of its outer manifestations¹³.

3. 2. God's Comedies

There is another trait worth mentioning, regarding this theme. Beyond the obvious purpose of denouncing the reality that Martins instead opts to exalt, the reality of a "land of clerks and prostitutes,/ all devoted to the miracle, chaste/ in their free hours of occult disease,/ land of heroes weighed in gold and blood/ and saints with their counters dried and soaked / at the bottom of virtue", as another Portuguese man of letters would later express it (Sena 1989: 85), the attitude taken by Eça towards his main character corresponds closely to the Author-God model in perversely submitting his lead figure to successive provocations with the sole and strict objective of straight facedly testing out a hypothesis, or resolving some enigma that he formulated for himself: is that which happens to Raposão (Teodorico Raposo, by nickname "Raposão", "Big Fox") above all by the workings of chance? Or do the authentic, ascribed skills of the Portuguese — of Aryan origin, as would also seem to be conveyed by his Germanised name, Teodorico — end up by prevailing in any case, as he most clearly becomes a Passepartout for life in society?

¹³ We would laterally take this occasion to add a couple of other factors. On the one hand, it is clear that everything happening in the novel is fostered by a factor that we may consider environmental or "mesologic": Teodorico's very undertaking of voyaging to the Orient. As regards progress, indeed... this is perhaps best encapsulated in the Martinian version by the fact that Raposão pro-gresses to the

The enclosing model, it should be highlighted, bears extremely close resemblance with characteristics of the obscure, labyrinthine and oneiric but also deliberately (and even perversely) playful Baroque world vision, underlying the work of Father António Vieira, for example, which Eça had clearly read and which, step by step, he was approaching¹⁴. We would refer to comments on the work of Vieira, precisely as regards these traceable Baroque features:

"This praise of obscurity, on the one hand, points to (...) the primacy of game and artifice and the acuteness of ingeniousness and, on the other, responds to another essential aspect of the global Baroque world perspective as it emerges stemming from the enigmatic character of the world and in resistance to a synthetic geometry based methodology (...). There is a clearly depreciative attitude towards simple, distinct and clear ideas as well as geometry based positions both from the ontological and the aesthetic points of view, hence, as a quality of style. Everything happens, and the image belongs to Vieira, as if each man was in some cave, watching a procession of a series of shadows that form the evidence that the author of the «comedy», God, wishes to communicate with him (...).

Why does God «amuse» Himself? For just what possible reason is the world a «divine comedy»? Why does God «play ball with his people»? Why does He make us spectators in a theatre with such an «obscure plot»? The response is founded upon the Baroque world perspective: God, as Vieira writes in the Livro Anteprimeiro da História do Futuro (Precursor Book on the History of the Future), is the author and governor of the world and also the «most shiningly perfect example of all nature and art», and achieves this through the greatest «manifestation of His glory and admiration of His wisdom». «Art» and «admiration» are the core expressions of relevance to our purpose here.

In effect, the Baroque cultivates the fragmentary, the unfinished, in a game of lights and shadows that is the fruit of art and the acuteness of engineering. Revealing the extent of the plot would be neither of utility nor in good taste. It would not prove useful as this does not cause «admiration» and not in good taste as obscurity is attributed aesthetic value, including in relation to the enjoyment and delight of the spectator or interpreter, alternatively, and as Vieira states, the «suspension of understanding and the sweet enrapture of the senses». Hence,

extent that he continues ever onwards (what alternatives!), throughout all this Portuguese tribulations in Portugal and in the Orient.

¹⁴ During the 1890s, Eça de Queirós wrote, and inspired on one of the sermons on the Rosary by Father António Vieira, the story of O Defunto (The Defunct), first published in 1895. Its themes are the illusions of mundane love and the fluidity of the borders between reality and dream and between life and death (cf. Matos 1993a).

subtlety and the art of God combine to clearly ensure, «the finest clarity that there may be», we are rendered «in the dark»" (Calafate 2002: 714-5).

Suffice to say, Eça does not seem to have been left completely satisfied with the emphasis on factors of the labyrinth and obscurity given how he simultaneously stresses the need to survive as the ultimate imperative beyond even all those hesitations and every impasse faced throughout this work. Indeed, faced by the erudite Germanic Topsius — he himself a research of more than doubtful scientific accuracy and ending up leaning, and on the request of Teodorico, to the most ignominious mystifications we may add that there is clearly some irony in his portrayal as it was a Portuguese adventurer, "Teodoricus, a Lusitanian" (Queirós 2000: 154; cf. also Silveira 2000: 576)¹⁵, that really provided full justification to the Faustian maxim that "in the beginning, there was Action" (Goethe 1958: 61). Indeed, we would recall how, to a certain extent, this maxim, or its Teodorician variant on the celebrated "heroism of affirmation" (or its absence in crucial moments), is that which, in the final reckoning seems to determine the fate of the character: "And all of this shall be lost! Why? Because there was a moment in which I lacked that «shameless heroism of affirmation», which, striking the Earth with firm feet, or meekly raising one's eyes to Heaven — created through the universal illusion, sciences and religions" (idem: 275).

This *activist* aspect to Teodorico clearly reflects the very perplexity when faced by the weight of chance in history — that is, the possibility of deeds of no apparent significance proving to cause such great repercussions and above all destructive repercussions on subsequent events — but which simultaneously translates into what may be termed a revolt against this fact and the conviction that, at the end of everything, it is just possible that, whether in spite of all this chance *or by riding it*, the genuine capacities of individuals might just still shine through. In fact, we encounter here a theme very typical to a certain strand of literary romanticism and its commentators, striving on the one hand to *distinguish* each unique reality through portraying the respective genetic features revealing its very "spirit" and separating it

¹⁵ In a somewhat more prosaic fashion, and approximating these two interlinked novels that are A *Reliquia* and O *Mandarim* (with its central character of Teodoro), it has also been proposed that Teodorico is, in sum, Teodoro + rico (rich) (cf. Queirós 2000: 280, note by Helena Cidade Moura).

from those others simply attributable to the random action of chance while, on the other hand, *recognising the interaction* of both aspects as relevant classes of factors (cf. Meinecke 1983: 384-5, 387, 389, 394-5, 434 and after). However, it is above all here that the type of attitude underlying the meditations of Martins according to which, and irrespective all of its devastating potential forces, chance should equally be turned into a means of expressing the skills and abilities of the more capable human groups, the Aryans, for whom the very devastation caused by this factor of chance may go far in opening their way, providing a vital space and a scope of opportunity¹⁶.

In conclusion, would chance not, sooner or later, drive the other trends, whether strengthening or countering the inequalities in the distribution of congenital capacities? In this work, with its central character a "Being with a dual bond to Passion and to Carnival" (Luzes 2000: 572)¹⁷, located in an ambiguous zone somewhere between the tragic and the farcical, Eça de Queirós seems to seek to leave this question unanswered and now also in a deliberate ambience of chiaroscuro: of doubt about all institutional "certainties", whether religious, scientific, philosophical or still

¹⁶ The extent to which chance is capable of introducing genuine novelty into the course of events and the extent to which such represent only a diversion (apparently chaotic) from the imposition of a predetermined necessity — pose issues that the philosophy of history of Martins, as well as that of Cournot, seem to leave as an enigma and actually unsolvable when all is said and done. On the one hand, an initial reading would seem to convey: "(...) these unpredictable shocks cause effects as much in the natural phenomena as in the lives of peoples and individuals: such was the case with the earthquake in preparing moods for accepting the yoke of the Marquis of Pombal; the discovery of the gold mines of Brazil; the fatal disaster of the son of King D. João II (who would have changed the course of history on the Peninsula); the defeat of Alcácer Quibir, brought about by the fortuitous paranoia of the king" (Catroga 1996: 131; cf. Martins 1957 II: 31-2).

On the other hand, the final victory of the Aryans is also deemed beyond all and any question and something that, whatever the respective causes, should above all take advantage from the natural course of chance: "Universal history shall thus end in a system without any exterior, in which the decadence of one of the Aryan branches will not impede the progressive advance of the whole, as demonstrated by its vanguards. And such progress will be guaranteed by the greater power (congenital) that the Aryan race will display towards the very challenges thrown up by chance and from which, in a final analysis, the full assumption of rationality will prove inseparable (...) from an ethical over-determination that the ideal of justice then embodies" (idem: 135).

^{17 &}quot;A Relíquia in its burlesque and serious aspects, is a reflection on the difficulty of existing and relating with others. The difficulties are placed in two circles, which do not overlap but are opposite poles — Teodorico and Jesus. Teodorico is born on Good Friday (the first was on the 15th day of the month of Nizam in the year of 33), with his mother perishing on that same day. When aged seven, his father suddenly dies on Shrove Tuesday, at a predestined distance to Good Friday. Shortly afterwards, he dreams that he finds himself «wandering alongside a clear river, by which the poplars, already very old, seem to have souls and breathe; and at my side there walks a naked man, with two holes in his feet and two holes in his hands, who was Jesus Our Lord»" (Luzes 2000: 572).

others, within which somebody may have displayed this "shameless heroism" and have managed to convince the others, but equally (and particularly) of self-revelation, of discovery and of becoming aware precisely through *rêverie* of the fundamental fragility of the entire human construct.

4. Martins' History in the Stories of Eça: O Mandarim

Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriad of inhabitants, was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, and let us consider how a man of humanity in Europe, who had no sort of connexion with that part of the world, would be affected upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity. He would, I imagine, first of all, vehemently express very strongly his sorrow for the misfortune of that unhappy people, he would make many melancholy reflections upon the precariousness of human life, and the variety of all labours of man, which could thus be annihilated in a moment. He would too, perhaps, if he was a man of speculation, enter into many reasonings concerning the effects which this disaster might produce upon the commerce of Europe, and the trade and business of the world in general. And when all this fine philosophy was over, when all these humane sentiments had been once fairly expressed, he would pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the same ease and tranquillity, as if no such accident had happened. The most frivolous disaster which could befall himself would occasion a more real disturbance. If he was to lose his little finger to-morrow, he would not sleep to-night; but, provided he never saw them, he will snore with the most profound security over the ruin of a hundred millions of his brethren, and the destruction of that immense multitude seems plainly an object less interesting to him, than this paltry misfortune of his own. To prevent, therefore, this paltry misfortune to himself, would a man of humanity be willing to sacrifice the lifes of one hundred millions of his brethren, provided he had never seen them?

(Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part III, Ch. III, § 4, pp. 136-7).

If you were able, by simple wish, to kill a man in China and inherit his fortune in Europe, with the supernatural conviction that nobody would know anything about the affair, would you be able to formulate that wish?

(François René de Chateaubriand, *Le Génie du Christianisme*, Part I, Book VI, Ch. II, cit. in Lopes 2001: 70).

However, whether better to consider as finite or as infinite the number of causes or series of causes contributing towards an event, good sense says there are *solidary* series and that mutually influence

each other and *independent* series, which, in effect, develop in parallel, or consecutively, without having the slightest of influences over each other, or (and which would seem to result in the same for us) without wielding any influence over each other that might be able to display appreciable effects. Nobody would seriously think that, treading one's food on the earth might perturb the explorer travelling the antipodes, or that it would interfere with Jupiter's system of satellites; but, in any case, the disturbance would be of such a small order of magnitude that it would not become manifest in any way perceivable to us and, for such reason, we are perfectly authorized not to take them into account. It is not impossible that an event occurred in China or in Japan might have a certain influence on facts that come to happen in Paris or in London; but, in general, it is most certain that the way the bourgeois of Paris set about their days is not influenced by what is really happening in some city in China where the Europeans have never penetrated. They exist as if two small worlds, each one of which may observe a chain of causes and effects simultaneously developing, without having any direct connection and without showing any appreciable signs of mutual influence.

(Antoine Augustin Cournot, Essai sur les Fondements de nos Connaissances et sur les Caractères de la Critique Philosophique, Ch. III, § 30, pp. 37-8).

4. 1. Economics and Chrematistics

While an appreciation and a parody of the theme of this "series" of untimely encounters of Cournot and Martins may easily be traced in *A Relíquia*, as regards the very core of the plot to *O Mandarim* we find, beyond the return of the aforementioned motif, an almost perfect correlation with Martins' concept that there were two feasible civilizational models possible: one of them is chrematistic and predatory, the European, while the other is economic and peaceful, the Chinese, with the latter ultimately condemned to succumbing to the former but with the victim still somehow in some way able to *contaminate* its conqueror.

In fact, and in exactly the same approach as Martins, Eça inclines towards the idea of the inevitable victory of the first model: history does not remember the weak, understandably, if only as they are not left around to write it. This fascination for the inevitability of eliminating more peaceful and more altruistic models of behaviour is, nonetheless, in the novelist's case accompanied by a dimension of sympathy for the victims, melancholic, and almost mournfully regretful — which, however, is overcome by the conviction that it is necessary to get on with life and hence that which was

simply was and everything that needs to be said has already been said ¹⁸. Behind the sarcasm, the doubt and the twisted smile, Eça's "moral of history", in existing, is necessarily piercingly sad, inclined towards disbelieving in human nature — and, in summary, perfectly compatible with both the "Faustian" model underlying the novel's narrative and the social-Darwinist horizon that frames much of the social theory characteristic of the late 19th century, and finally also with the famous feature of *vencidismo* (*defeatism*), the disillusionment and misanthropy characteristic of the socialed *Geração de 70*, or the Portuguese (18)70s generation.

Matters are, nevertheless, far more subtle than this schematic presentation would have us believe. In order to be precise and flesh out our approach, we first need to make a brief return to the work of Martins. According to his perspective, stemming from a particular interpretation of the works of Proudhon and Jevons, socialism, that is, the access of workers to *integral production*, would end up prevailing as the form of economic organisation particularly as a consequence of the excess of capital (accompanied by a rise in their mobility and a tendency for interest to swing to zero or close to zero), as well as the saturation of end consumer markets (with marginal utility approximating null for consumers). As he sets out in *A Inglaterra de Hoje (England Today)*, one of his last books, this evolution would be attributed to the spontaneous results of economic processes, therefore inherently not needing any political intervention (cf. Martins 1951: 234-6, 238, 259).

This law of declining pleasure, as it might be termed, Martins assumes poses the main means of recovering from the problems of his time. As he then guarantees, it represents a clear fact that "moral man is depressed, if not annihilated. Earning and enjoying, earning to enjoy, is his gospel, as petty as it is incoherent" (idem: 265-6). However, exactly this, in essence, as the depth of the problem, may also prove a solution. Thus, he clarifies "men are worth more. We have within us an instinct of order and justice that protests" (idem: 255). After all, happily, we do not only have this: "because earning requires so much more than just labour, and enjoyment, in the end, becomes an intolerable bore" (idem: 266). And, thus, the same happens to

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¹⁸ Concerning regrets for victims and the suspicions as to predatory processes enrolling society at large, but referring to one particular individual's social trajectory, we should refer to the aforementioned François René de Chateubriand, whose family had become very wealthy and ascended to nobility just before he was born, and largely thanks to slave traffic. Concerning this, see Izenberg 1992: 259, Sutherland 2003: 7-8, Miller 2008: 99-100.

pleasure as happens to the profitability of capital "and is explained by the law of Stanley Jevons" (idem: 266). The society to come is, therefore, a society of an economic ataraxic peace of mind corresponding to a terminal *steady state*. Indeed, only in this sense might this be a socialist society and resulting from some variety of moral implosion, a consequence of a worsening of the existing evils:

"We approach the time when we reap the final consequences of our chrematistic exploitation of the world, we draw close to an instant when we understand the intimate emptiness of wealth. To the very coarse man, incapable of other desires, come, with the plenitude of money, satiated and the tedium. And see them dragged into a decadent life..." (idem: 262).

Or later on, and now with a cheerier inflection and serener in tone:

"Therefore, as an optimist, in conclusion I believe that the conversion of national debts, reducing interest rates to a minimum, out of worker industrial cooperation, organically suppressing the need for capital intervention in industry; through calming the fevers of the game, suppressing its raw materials and satiating the animal instincts: out all of this and due to everything that may be correspondingly inferred and is bound up with the natural evolution of affairs, European societies, firstly, and then those overseas, shall over the course of time slowly but surely enter into the normal life of peace, virtue and work" (idem: 267).

In any case, we should also note that the attitude of Martins towards this eventuality is definitely not quite clear, given he also considered China as an example of a society that precisely embodied part of this ideal (and which, furthermore was also self-sufficient from the economic point of view), while England depended entirely on international trade for its existence and is on the contrary therefore an example of a rapacious society (cf. idem: 256). Nevertheless, to Martins, Chinese society simultaneously symbolised, and at more than just one perspective, the very absence of creativity and intelligence, that which he considered the empire of *positivism* and headless ritualization — which, one must duly recognise, enables right from the outset the calling into question of not only the coherence and feasibility of such an economic program but also in fact the very good faith of whoever designed and presented it.

Approaching this point in more detail, we already know that for Martins there is one continent and one race that represent the culmination of human evolution. In accordance with his words, "This place is Europe, this is the Indo-European" (Martins 1921 I: 45). Such a fact, however, did not provide the grounds for any optimism, given that, indeed rendering explicit his merely tautological and deterministic conception of progress, Joaquim Pedro also admits to a tragic end for the entire set of the aforementioned evolution¹⁹. Still, what must be underlined here is the role that, and specifically out of its contrast with Europe, China plays in the speculative meanderings of Martins:

"Hence, civilisation always runs as if a river to its mouth, beyond which science does not tell us whether it shall be an open sea of fortunate ideals or a puddle of Chinese positivism. Because, in the same way that so many human civilisations did not get beyond aborted attempts (...): thus, the aborting of total civilisation will necessarily not prove anything against the ideal exactitude of this destiny: it will prove only [that] despite all their skills, not even the Indo-Europeans themselves were able to render real the ideas that they nevertheless were able to conceive" (idem: 60-1).

Referring furthermore to that which he considers the fate of European evolution, and besides conceiving this as a dually converging conclusion — "democracy as a natural and necessary term of the organic development of Aryan society, and the universal empire of our race, as also a necessary result of the historical dynamism or the competition between the different human races" (Martins 1957 II: 38) — Joaquim Pedro similarly highlighted how he felt it was going to become necessary not so much to strive to absorb outer barbarians but rather inner ones. In summary, this was about integrating *the masses*, which in turn meant resolving the problems around class conflicts:

¹⁹ In truth, Martins rationally posits a framework for the existence of absolute limits to feasible progress, with the corresponding prevalence on final instance of a kind entropy principle, and such a reality he supposes only the *eternal* ideas may prove able to escape: "However, does the civilisation of humanity have to stop at a particular point in its development, that is, that moment coinciding with the maximum limit of the capacity to improves its races, there shall follow the degradation, degenerating through to dying, as we have seen with particular or local civilisations? This is likely to be, this must be as the vital rhythm is the condition for everything that really exists: only the ideas of reason are real, absolute and eternal!" (Martins 1921 I: 73-4).

"Either having finished his great feat of conquering the world, the Aryan will find in himself the strength to constitute order in democracy, or the Aryan civilisation, universally all-conquering, will fall to an earth rendered petty, likely destroyed, not by barbarians from afar, but by the barbarians that every society contains within — the vast army of miserable plebs!" (idem: 38)²⁰.

Nevertheless, Martins somewhat apprehensively records that even then one civilisation shall persist, not included within this evolutionary framework. However, this very fact did not per se amount to any cause for concern:

"The domination of China, it is true, remains to be done but it may not be any source of danger, even when still to be vanquished, as the empire of the Centre is not made up of barbarians but rather a cultured people, civilised, and who would have attained the democratic period if only abstract notions were compatible with Mongolic mental capacities" (idem: 37-8).

In addition to all this, China imported all armaments and weaponry from the Europeans, who were thereby informed they had nothing left to learn from her; and it is well known that "in every nation where the foreigner — the enemy! — provides the means of defence, this foreigner will soon take over the rule" (idem: 15).

Chinese civilisation thus represents a somewhat excessive tendency towards equilibrium, which brought about a premature end of history, something that would

²⁰ Truth be said, Martins seemed sometimes slightly timorous regarding the consequences of democracy, even among a sound, reasonable people like the English: "In the countryside, the landowner loses everyday his influence, and at the same the enlargement of the franchise multiplies the number of rural votes. The majority of proprietors is conservative, but the majority of voter is radical, or at least liberal. In old days England came to perform a reproduction of republican, senatorial Rome: democracy governed by an aristocracy. Opinion reigned but the grandees governed. Old families fabricated the personnel needed for public offices: ministers, MPs, generals, diplomats. Today the case is totally different" (idem: 175). However, all things considered he does expect a robust common sense to prevail in the end: "In a simplified form, the situation presents itself to us quite clearly: facing a plutocracy, an army of proletarians already armed with political rights. The constitutional victory of the labour party [English and italics in the original] does not to me seem difficult to prophesy. Another thing is to tell what they will do with it. Will they try, the French way or the German way, to turn society upside down, architecting some civitas solis? They lack, fortunately for them, imagination for such an endeavour. And they exceed in the solid qualities of prudence" (idem: 188). After the British being persuaded to/by prudence, other Aryans are of course supposed to follow their trail: fabula de te narratur...

also have happened in Europe had the Roman empire been able to absorb the Germanic barbarian invaders (cf. idem: 24-5)²¹. Otherwise, on arriving in "our empire of old age" (idem: 16), when the Aryans, universally dominant, return to the origins and whatever remains of the fantastic Lemuria, Oceania, perhaps they shall also be rendered *Sinized* to a greater or lesser extent. This would not come to happen, however, until the British, North Americans and Russians had advanced and taken over the precious space now occupied by the Chinese (cf. idem: 15, 18-9)²². And, above all, it would be highly unlikely that the Aryan brotherhood of peoples ever one day enter into perpetual peace, even at its very heart:

"Meanwhile, while this empire that shall soon reign universal for the Indo-Europeans does share an ethno-genetic unity, nobody should confuse this meaning as some expression of a unified political domain. The same vital law of competition between the great divisions in the

²¹ According to Joaquim Pedro: "If that evolution had not happened, and we have seen happening to Germanic populations from beyond the Rhine what occurred with the Celts from beyond: entering the gravity of the empire, they became Latinised; led by the hand of the educators, they would have more swiftly crossed the successive moments in the organic development of societies, and Europe would by chance still today display an example analogous to China, consisting of a single nation made up of various branches of the Aryan family in the same way that China congregates so many branches of the Mongol family into one empire" (Martins 1957 II: 24-5).

²² To Martins, it is an almost certain fact that China would be divided up between the Anglo-Saxons and the Slavs, that is to say, British, North-Americans and Russians. The solution to the *Chinese question* is furthermore inherently bound up with a demographic problem and specifically a problem of *demographic sequestration*, as various contemporary commentators diagnosed the situation of Europe, especially that of nations such as France and Germany. (On this issue, and as regards the case of France and the opinions of the academic Paul Leroy-Beaulieu on demographic trends, cf. Graça 2002: 324 and after). According to Joaquim Pedro, "We can, we should assume that in a few centuries China will be divided (between the United States, Russia and Britain?) and subject to a regime of occupation and forced labour, as is the case with the other Mongol and Malay countries; a regime that, unifying the world under the Aryan civilisation, will bring about the depopulation of this excessively prolific empire, the solution to the other side of the problem that concerns, when not frightens, thinkers" (Martins 1957 II: 15).

Still furthermore, as regards conflicts between the various Aryan branches: "The Greek branch was defeated by the Latin, and then the Latin by the Germanic: what destiny does the future prepare for the future of each Indo-European nation? Diversely endowed, but in a way that renders them close equivalents, also almost equally civilised, it would not seem to be war that is going to determine the contest but primarily the faculty of propagation and political genius. Without doubt, the division of China, with its five hundred million men representing a third of the global population and in possession of one of its best regions, throws great uncertainty over any forecasting. Should China fall to France or Germany, we would see these two nations, today condemned to curtailed futures in the extremes of Europe, one because without propagating there is no emigrating, the other because the excess of its population is absorbed by the Anglo-Saxon depths in the Americas; we would see them acquire an eminent place in the victorious destinies of the world. Today, with the knowledge available, the future would seem to belong to the Slav and the Anglo-Saxon that through diverse modes are numerically and geographically expanding" (idem: 18-9).

human family that shall certainly bring victory to the Aryan breed, this same law shall also determine struggle between its various branches" (idem: 18).

Let us now change in tone, while nevertheless following the writings of Joaquim Pedro. This same China, overly concerned with equilibrium, obsessively ritualistic, headless and endlessly copying, this China which for all such reasons deserves to die²³, this same China still represents, and far deeper than just some idle label, the model of a "non-chrematistic", rather strictly "economic" society instead, that Martins sets out as the materialization of Justice, with worker access to "production in the integral" and the imposition of some form of reasonableness and humanity onto material life. This amounts to a version of Martins' reasoning according to which the very self-centring process tends towards producing a state of affairs more compatible with the dictums of the morality of labour, justice and peace. Against this Chinese model, Martins continued to posit that represented by the English reality:

"We may abstractly propose a nation similar to China, for example, that does not have external trade: a nation, living off its natural goods and own labours, consuming just as much as it produces, developing in isolation as a single self-contained economic body, without relations, dependencies, nor an empire incorporating other peoples. We may, on the other hand, suppose a nation such as England, for example, where the soil does not provide food for its inhabitants, where everything is transformed in cities and factories, in which foreign trade, and the dependencies and economic empire wielded over other peoples establish the very foundations for the collective wealth.

It is clear that, in the first hypothesis, the greater and more constitutional thinking will be order in the economy, the normality of distribution of a wealth placed entirely under the auspices of the law, because from such normality derive the peace and fortune of the people. However, for this very reason, in the latter, wealth flows from the exploitation of foreign countries, and for this reason extends beyond the scope of laws: and it is also clear that the

²³ It should be noted that as regards the *Chinese question* Martins held a somewhat different opinion to that of Cournot, even while certainly influenced by him. In fact, according to the latter, European and Chinese civilisations should instead end up converging, "as the outwards movements of their populations joined on the Pacific shores of America, in a common post-historical order" (Anderson 1992: 303). Hence, the vision of Cournot proves more melancholically *post-historic*, while Martins would nevertheless seem to expect more of the vicissitudes (and violence) appropriate to history. This is why, and due to the race factor counting far more in his framework, such a final *Sinization* only comes about following the complete absorption of China by the Aryan civilisation.

greater and more constitutional thinking will focus on, instead of order and distribution, the effectiveness of the means of conquest and wealth. One is a society run according to the economic norm; the other a society operating according to the commercial, or chrematistic norm. The first one works and distributes, the other conquers and stores the plunder" (Martins 1951: 256).

Nevertheless, and in setting out the various possible means of protectionism, the same Martins also verifies, or believes verified, that in England "the collective sentiment is imperialist" (idem: 171). And, in this context, he does not shy away from unrestrainedly applauding the ongoing imperialist wave and also tending to express support for the conservative wing:

"Were I English, I would applaud *manibus pedibus* the policy of Beaconsfield [Disraeli], so clearly sensible that it convinced the best of the Whigs, civilising the party and tying it to the *Tories* of the Salisbury ministry and the unionist group of Hartington and Chamberlain. With the *old man* [Gladstone] went the extreme tail of the party today doubling up to bite by the serpentine mouth of Labouchère. If I were English, I would be of the current of opinion that, rather than looking forwards to the future emancipation of the colonies, would, on the contrary, advocate a policy of closer relations with them; opposing the radical protectionism of continental European nations and the Americanism of the Monroe doctrine, proclaimed on the tariffs of McKinley, by means of a *Zollverein* or customs union between the dispersed ganglia of the English national-colonial body" (idem: 172).

We should therefore, and in summary, distinguish between the two models of protectionism within the mental framework of Martins and their corresponding economic facets: one is the Chinese, which is economic and moralising, and bordering more closely on the Martinian conception of socialism; the other is the English, which is chrematistic, imperialist and rapacious. Nevertheless, given the protectionist currents Martins was witnessing, he recommended adopting the latter model, based on the premeditated ransacking of the colonies. This consequently serves not to bring on the final triumph of Justice, rather acting to delay it — but Martins sets out why he considered this the only reasonable evolutionary path. Indeed, it is difficult to clearly

discern, throughout the reasoning of Joaquim Pedro, between the specifically economic considerations and the others, more strictly dictated by political factors. If English workers seem inclined towards a collective imperialist passion, just why might that be a good thing? Should you seek to gain economic advantages for the country, gathering the fruits of undertakings, or does this especially represent some highly convenient form of diversion able to maintain the spirit of the plebs apart from *political* socialism?

In any case: where the objective is entering a dash to colonialism, at a pinnacle among the English and in all others, we shall be delaying fair solutions, given that for Martins the very exchange of finished products for raw materials was in itself an unequal exchange and a rapacious act beyond enabling continuity to be rendered to what the Portuguese intellectual himself diagnosed as an infernal dance. In case this instead involves peoples turning in exclusively upon themselves, perhaps it will actually result in the fall of interest rates to zero or almost zero. Justice and Fraternity? Perhaps yes. However, taking as credible what Martins writes in other contexts, also the arrival at a type of evolutionary dead-end, or a Chinese kingdom of stupidity that actually means both the end of history and the end of everything worthy of interest — whatever the meaning of this latter expression. We thereby understand his perplexity, and indeed also his vertigo at the possibility of *killing the mandarin*...²⁴

4. 2. The Country of Orange Groves

We now return to Eça's novel. Its obvious Goethe inspired background — the pact with the devil, Mignon's poems, the *country of orange trees*, etcetera — conjures the atmosphere that enables the author to express his moral ambivalence (or rather: his oscillation between sympathy for the victims and his absolute conviction of the need to do them violence), which on the one hand has obvious analogous correspondences to Martins' models of the economy and historical evolution and on the other hand evokes the very relationship between Faust and Margarita.

²⁴ For an anti-colonialist reading of *O Mandarim*, see Berrini 1993a, Matos 1993b, Matos 1993c, Lopes 2001.

However, concerning the Goethean references, there is truly a great deal more of interest in the novel. Throughout its extent, Eça makes a clear point of placing Portugal and China into a particularly interesting relationship as it proves especially ambiguous and inter-changeable. Hence, the daring but ignorant Teodoro, the main character, learns rapidly from the Russian general and diplomat Camilloff, "heroic officer of the campaigns in central Asia, and then the Ambassador of Russia to Peking" (Queirós 2000a: 41), who maintains that if Portugal had received from the Chinese tea and the word for it ("châ"), in exchange would have invented for them, in her glorious past eras and based upon the verb "mandar" (to command), the very word "mandarim" (mandarin), later exported to the other European languages but not welcomed into the actual language of the Celestial Empire:

"Early the other day, shut in with the general in one of the garden's stalls, I told him my lamentable history and the motives that had brought me to Peking. The hero listened, seriously twisting on his thick Cossack moustache.

Does my dear guest know any Chinese? — he asked me all of a sudden, fixing me with his wise eyes.

— I know two important words, general: «mandarin» and «tea».

He passed his strongly veined hands over the bothersome scar that stretched across his bald skull:

- «Mandarin», my friend, is not a Chinese word and nobody understands it in China. It is the name given in the 16th century by explorers from your country, from your fine country...
 - When we had explorers... I murmured, sighing.

He sighed as well, out of politeness, and continued.

- That these explorers gave to Chinese functionaries. It comes from the verb, from your beautiful verb...
- When we had verbs... I snarled, in the instinctive habit of denigrating the Fatherland.

He stuttered a moment and his intense, masculine eyes looked up — and continued patient and serious:

— From your fine verb «command»... and so there remains «tea». This is a word that has a vast role in Chinese life but I believe it insufficient to serve for all social intercourse (...)" (idem: 43-4)²⁵.

It is also this emulator of Michel Strogoff who explains rejection to Teodoro as he tirelessly pursues his project of redeeming himself through marrying the widow of a dead mandarin. The indignation and disconcertedness of the Portuguese could not be more suggestive:

"But why would she refuse? — I exclaimed. — I belong to a good gamily from the Minho province. I am an educated graduate; therefore in China, as in Coimbra, I am a man of letters! I have served in state administration... I own millions... I have experience of an administrative nature..." (idem: 44).

Unfortunately, however, neither Teodoro having originated from the over-populated province of Minho, nor being a public servant, nor a man of letters educated in Coimbra, nor even being immensely rich served the purpose. Alternative courses of action — including handing over half of his patrimony to the Chinese public treasury, handing out large quantities of rice to a famine beset population — also did not result and indeed producing tremendously perverse effects and seriously threatening the very physical integrity of the benefactor. It remained only to seek out the family of the mandarin, compensate them in an appropriate form and pay due homage worthy of the deceased. To this end, however, it is necessary to learn how to dress and behave as the Chinese — in which Teodoro actually excels:

"My face yellowed, my long, hanging moustache favouring this characterisation — and when, on the following morning, after having been dressed by the ingenious tailors on Chá-Cua Street, I entered the room finished in scarlet silk, where the porcelain lunch dishes already

bureaucrats in India, Indochina and China (cf. Lach 1972: 545).

²⁵ Irrespective of the function served by this philology in the plot of *O Mandarim*, it should be noted that the etymology of the word *mandarim* that is related back to the Portuguese verb *mandar* (to command, to order) is very probably wrong, and despite the frequency with which it is referred to; and indeed also in its exclusive association of the term to China. According to David Lach, the true origins of the term derive from the Hindu and Malay word *mantri*, which came to be used for

flashed on the black surface, — the mandarin's wife startled by the likely apparition of Tong-Tché, the very Son of Heaven! (...)

And, out of the mysterious correlations with which the clothing influences character, I already felt in me Chinese ideas and instincts: — the love of meticulous ceremonies, the respect for bureaucratic procedures, by a learned point of scepticism; and also an abject terror of the emperor, the hatred of the foreigner, the cult of one's ancestors, the fanaticism of tradition, a taste for sweetened things" (idem: 46).

When, at a later moment, they discuss their impressions of Peking, once again the Russian general clarifies the Portuguese *tourist* and corrects his ignorant temerity. However, not even for this does he get less judgemental or less unwilling to flagellate his country. In addition to the mere statistical "detail" that consists of learning that China, when all is said and done, has three-hundred or five-hundred million inhabitants (see above, 2. 2.), there is clearly no further need to explain the analogy and simultaneous divergences from the diagnosis put forward by Martins.

"Peking is a monster! — Said Camilloff, reflectively balancing his skull. — And now consider that in this capital, to the Tartar class that rules, are subject three-hundred million people, a subtle, laborious, suffering, prolific, invasive people... now studying our sciences... A chalice of Medoc, Teodoro?... They have a formidable navy! The army, that was once persuaded to destroy the foreigner with paper dragons that spat out jets of fire, now has Prussian tactics and long rifles! Serious!

— And nevertheless, general, in my country, when, in relation to Macau, they talk of the Celestial Empire, the patriots run fingers through their hair-locks and negligently bluster: «We will send fifty men there and we shall sweep China before us...»

This folly — was met with silence. And the general, after having coughing impressively, murmured condescendingly:

— Portugal is a beautiful country...

I exclaimed with certainty and firmness:

— It's a cesspit, general" (idem: 53).

Immediately afterwards however, there comes perhaps the most subtle allusion by Eça to the parallelism in the situations between Portugal and China, indeed, in accordance with a model of alienation and *self-foreignerisation* that the renowned

term "cesspit" ("choldra", recurrent in Eça's work) suggests. The mandarin's wife, earlier characterised as "tall and blond; she had the green eyes of the mermaids of Homer" (idem: 43), whose hands exuded "a fine aroma of sandalwood and tea" and with whom Teodoro had already conversed widely "on Europe, nihilism, Zola, Leo XIII, and the slimness of Sarah Bernhardt..." (idem: 43), intervenes strongly in defence of Portugal, but equivocates in her Goethean reference:

"It is the land of the song of Mignon. It is there that the orange groves flourish...

The fat Meriskoff, a German Letters PhD from the University of Bonn, chancellor of the Legation, man of poetry and comment, respectfully observed to this end:

— My dear madam, the sweet country of Mignon is Italy: *Do you know the blessed land where the orange tree blossoms?* The divine Goethe was referring to Italy, *Italia Mater...* Italy shall be the eternal love of sensitive humanity" (idem: 53-4).

Indeed, precisely this point serves to clarify several others. Firstly, if the general's wife had made an obvious mistake as to the exact direction imprinted into her *Sehnsucht*, the character that diligently sought to clarify her, the Germanised Russian of German erudition, did run into some equivocation as well. Here is what Goethe's poem actually says:

"Do you know the country where the lemon groves flourish?

Among the dark branches burn golden oranges,

The blue sky breathes a gentle sigh,

There, the myrtle rises, calmly, looking at high-reaching laurel!

Do you know? (...)" (Goethe 1986: 103; cf. also Goethe 1991: 195)²⁶

However, the apparent lapse that ended up replacing *country of lemon groves* with *country of orange groves* is perhaps not innocent in origin. To be sure, the French version of the poem, Eça's possible source for knowledge about the work, precisely refers to Italy: "*Connais-tu le pays où fleurit l'oranger*?" (cf. Laffont-Bompiani, org.,

²⁶ In the original: "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühn,/ Im dunkeln Laub die Goldorangen glühn,/ Ein sanfter Wind vom blauen Himmel weht,/ Die Myrte still und hoch der Lorbeer steht,/ Kennst du es wohl?" (Goethe 1986: 102).

1994: 4670)²⁷. Eça, nevertheless, who as we saw had already displayed his great etymologic interest in this novel, would naturally also have known that "orange", in German might be expressed either as *Orange* or as *Apfelsine* (cf. Wahrig 1975: 2715-6), with the latter literally "apple of China", and hence *country of orange groves* may clearly also refer to the *country of the apple of China*, or more simply, China.

5. We, Others

In Goethe's work, we should note, and despite the term used in this poem rooted in *Orange*, we may already truly find expression, although in a very ambiguous fashion (mixed in with exaltation and praise), of an odd and *Chinaesque* feeling caused by Italy, formerly grandiose and imperial, and already in his time perceived as a transalpine Europe falling within a trajectory approaching the eastern Mediterranean, and actually already to a certain extent "Asian" or, in a somewhat diverse sense, "underdeveloped" (cf. Vidal-Naquet 1993: 152 and after)²⁸.

In Eça's work, this "Asia" is very obviously among us. What he suggests is that the "Asiatic" (the "Chinese", the "Byzantines" or whatever other variant on this theme) are us, we others the Portuguese, also once a grandiose and imperial realm and now a country of bureaucracies and weird *Chinoiseries* or *Chinese pettifications* (or *Byzantine pettifications*, should you prefer; in Portuguese: "chinesices" and "bizantinices"). Still more specifically: a country grown strange to itself, or at least in

²⁷ According to the *Dictionnaire des Oeuvres*, from the story of Mignon was also extracted a similarly named comic opera in three acts written by Ambroise Thomas, with the libretto by Michel Carré and Jules Barbier, which premiered in Paris in 1866 (cf. Laffont and Bompiani, org., 1994: 4671). It would not seem absurd to accept the Portuguese novelist knew of this other work.

²⁸ Vidal-Naquet refers in particular to the case of Volney, whose *Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie* (Voyage to Egypt and Syria) provided the very model of approaching the theme of underdevelopment as something different from the older model of Asiatism or Orientalism: "Important date, this journey, because what Volney discovers there is not the Orient of the origins, nor even a land of abstract despotism that had rather ambiguously inspired so many of the contemporaries of Louis XIV and Louis XV, is instead, very exactly, what we today call the «underdeveloped» world, the third world. The book effectively deals with describing a sick world and, to the amazement of commentators, the first chapter that makes a classification of the inhabitants, introduces, «for no apparent reason, a development on disease». The Orient proves neither exotic nor picturesque; it is run down and degraded, as it took the wrong historical path. And when we read the celebrated description of Alexandria, it is truly the third world, with its crowds and overwhelming poverty, that leaps into our vision" (Vidal-Naquet 1993: 152).

the imaginary perspective of its intellectual class — precisely that which in the work of Eça gets named the famous "cesspit".

Could this country of pen pushers in the meanwhile contest and be awaken by... the virile "Aryan" or "headstrong" therapy of Martins? It proves very doubtful whether this might be feasible. It is unavoidable and worthy of duly noting that the Mandarinizing or Byzantinizing evolutionary theme, conceived as "bureaucratic crystallisation" of the economy and the society, also emerges in and around this period in the works of various other commentators on European affairs. Vilfredo Pareto, for example, writes on the issue and in broadly similar tones: the need for more "lions" and fewer "foxes", more audacity and virility, and less prudence and calculation, etcetera (cf. Pareto 1968: 1714-7 and 1757-61, §§ 2553 and 2610-2; see also Aron 1997: 448-9) And this, it should be noted, despite the same Pareto, in a somewhat contradictory fashion also identifying the "speculators" or risk-lovers with the aforementioned "foxes", supposedly preferential holders of the remaining traces of class I, which would seem an involuntary reductio ad absurdum of his own explanatory model. In fact, Pareto seems to think both in terms of a perpetual alternation between phases and in a true trend that would, again also here, be pushing Europe away from some heroic tradition. As regards a possible reversion of this process, he both considers this with great distance, affecting a détaché style, while also suggesting the looming imminence of some "leonine" coup d'état that would invert everything:

"A period of «individualism» (in which connections are weak) prepares a period of «statism» (in which connections are strong) and vice-versa. In the first period, private initiative prepares the materials that the rigid institutions of the state make use of during the second; and during the latter, the growing drawbacks to social crystallization prepare for the decadence that only again the appearance of lightness and liberty of action of private individuals is able to transform into progress (...). A society in which persons abundantly endowed with the residuals of class I have every freedom of action, appears as if disordered; furthermore, a part of wealth is certainly wasted on sterile efforts. Consequently, when the crystallisation begins, society does not only seem better organised but also more prosperous. The crystallisation of Roman society, during the latter's Empire, was not only imposed by the government; it was also desired by society itself that perceived such would bring about an improvement in their conditions (...).

Nowadays, crystallisation is beginning, exactly as in the case of the Roman Empire. This is desired by the populations and, in numerous cases, seems to enhance prosperity. Without doubt, we are still far from a state in which a worker is definitively ascribed to his profession; but the workers' unions, the restrictions placed on circulation between the various states, set us off down this path (...). The governments and municipalities intervene ever more in our economic affairs. They are encouraged to this by the will of the populations and frequently to their apparent advantage (...).

In conclusion, it is easy to see that we are moving along a similar curve that has already been taken by the Roman society after the founding of the Empire, and which, after having purveyed a period of prosperity, extended into decadence. History never repeats itself, and it is not at all probable, unless some kind of «yellow danger» is brought into being, that a future and new period of prosperity derives from another barbarian invasion. It would be more probable that such results from an internal revolution, which would hand power to the individuals holding an abundance of the residues of class II, and who know, who are able, who want to make use of strength. However, these far distant and uncertain eventualities belong to the domain of fantasy more than the one of experimental science" (Pareto 1968: 1714-7, §2553)²⁹.

However, the register in Eça is clearly different, with the novelist seemingly extraordinarily able to maintain himself, once again, in that aforementioned chiaroscuro zone which, among other aspects, enables a superb (though subliminal) reverse reading — indeed, as suggested by the very emphasis on the theme of *commandment* — of the

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versa" (idem: 1760-1, § 2612).

²⁹ The counterfactual to the reality of European history, meanwhile, is well within our reach: "In the Roman Empire in the East, the state of crystallisation lived on while it was destroyed in the West; and we may observe the effects of organisation taken to the extreme (...)" (idem: 1757, § 2610). "(...) we may easily grasp why and how step by step the provinces of the Empire were lost, until finally the capital itself. It is necessary to note that such a phenomenon is not particular to Byzantine bureaucracy; it is general and almost always appears in the senile phase of bureaucracies. It has been observed and is observable still in China, in Russia and in other countries. In this way, social organisation begins by bringing prosperity and ends by causing ruin" (idem: 1759-60, § 2611). Still furthermore: "As we have highlighted on various occasions, and we again highlight, the waves of derivations follow on from the facts. It is for this reason when, around a century ago, a period of liberty was in ascendance, the crystallised and restrictive institutions of the Byzantine Empire came under attack. Today, we are in a period of descending liberty, with the organisational on the rise, and there is admiration and praise of these same institutions; it is proclaimed that the European peoples owe a great deal of recognition to the Byzantine Empire, that it would have saved them from Muslim invasion; and overlooking how the brave soldiers of western Europe always knew alone how to defeat and send fleeing the Arabs and Turks on countless occasions, and that before the Asian peoples, they themselves held Constantinople. Byzantium makes us see where the curve our societies currently follow can take us. Whoever wants to admire this future is also led to admire this past, and vice-

tirades such as that by Martins, when praising the Aryan race and its rise to dominance, peremptorily guaranteeing that:

"(...) already in the brain of the pastor, singing Vedic hymns to the hills, there is a subconscious awareness of the sharpness of the thinking of a Hegel, of a Goethe; already in the village, with its institutions, there are the constitutional features of European society; already in the obscure fermentations of the imaginations of these barbarians, the seeds of philosophy and of science; already in its decisive boldness, *in its irresistible commandment*, the motive of a future universal empire" (Martins 1921 I: 243; my italics).

Just who is and who is not the "barbarian" and the "civilised" here, and according to what category? Who deserves to be considered "ours" and who is "theirs" or "foreign", and as regards who or referring to what aspects? Within the same line of reading upside down the theses of Martins, and in particular as regards his attitude towards Fate, attentive to what Volney declared, back at the beginning of the 19th century, as regards the idolatry of Greeks and Romans characteristic of a certain historiography:

"I am always surprised by the analogy that I detect daily between the savages of North America and the ancient peoples, which draw such praise, of Greece and Italy. I reencounter in the Greeks of Homer and especially in his Iliad, the uses, the discourses, the habits of the Iroquois, the Delawares, the Miamis. The tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides describe almost literally the opinions of the red men on need, on fatality, on the misery of the human condition and on the harshness of a blind destiny" (cit. in Vidal-Naquet 1993: 154).

At the same time as Volney was moving away from idolatry vis-à-vis the traditionally presumed illustrious forefathers of Europe, he inclined towards a fundamental unity in human destinies. Instead of the *clash of civilizations*, we have nothing more than the pure and simple barbarity of our allegedly egregious civilizational grandparents, indeed our tribal "founding fathers": the fundamental Other is now only in the obscure past, not in the present that Enlightenment may be able to restore in its entirety and throughout its full ecumenical extent:

"(...) in Athens, this sanctuary of all liberties, there were four slave heads for every free one; there were not one single household where the despotic regime of our American colonies wasn't wielded by these alleged democrats; in the around four million souls that would have inhabited ancient Greece, over three million were slaves; the political and civil inequality of man was the dogma of the peoples, of the legislators; it was consecrated by Lycurgus, by Solon, professed by Aristotle, by the divine Plato, by the generals and ambassadors of Athens, of Sparta and Rome who, in the works by Polybius, Tito Livio, Thucydides, speak like the ambassadors of Attila and Genghis Khan. Yes, the more I studied Antiquity and its ever so praised governments, the more I came to realise that the Mamluks of Egypt and the Bey of Algiers did not essentially differ from those of Sparta and Rome, and that these so highly praised Greeks and Romans as much deserved the names of Huns and Vandals to appropriately define their character" (cit. in idem: 154-5).

More broadly, and as Amartya Sen observes in a chronologically less distant article, an important feature for the intellectual reality of poor countries is the fact that the very "confrontational relationships often lead people to see themselves as «the other» — defining their identity as being emphatically <u>different from</u> that of Western people" (Sen 2003: 18; Sen's underlining), that is, the economically and culturally dominant peoples.

We are able to understand, precisely given the very example of the Portuguese generation of the 1870s, some of the examples of pitfalls and labyrinths awaiting along a trajectory characterised by this ill-being — among others, the sick intermingling of love and hate in the relationship with one's own country, the unbalanced, but self-perpetuating alternation, between patriotic bravado and the tendency towards collective self-humiliation... Meanwhile, despite this, or exactly due to this, should we consider the output of the aforementioned generation in terms of economic thought? The lack of any theory referring to development and/or underdevelopment, or at least something approximating it, is indeed fairly notorious with this shortcoming becoming still more noticeable when taking into consideration the obsession that this group of thinkers, in vivid contrast, experimented with the theme of the *decadence of peoples*. We may rather easily conclude that the practically omnipresent utilisation of the theme of "cesspit", of one's own identity conceived of as a repulsive otherness, would have

derived from, at least partially, precisely this feeling, spread throughout society to a greater or lesser extent, of underdevelopment — even if, and quite importantly, that underdevelopment could not be approached as such but only through more or less elliptical and "displaced" or "dislocated" concepts: *Decadentism*, self-exoticism, *Orientalism*, and alike.

Be as it may, in terms of the identity and the otherness, the sympathy and the schizoid merged to different extents, it is absolutely necessary to highlight here, as an individualized moment, the uniqueness of Eça's position — the same Eça, we should recall, who liked to wear Chinese Mandarin clothing and let himself be photographed in this pose (cf. Matos 1993: 452) — in addition to, and in this case above all in sharp contrast with that of his friend Martins, the richness, the finery and the humanity of his fundamental attitude. To be precise, it should be said that Eça not only elicits his own identification with the dead Mandarin (the well-known pose wearing the silk kimono), but also with Teodoro. The author was himself originally from Entre-Douro-e-Minho (Póvoa do Varzim), had graduated in law from Coimbra ("as everybody did..."), he was a civil servant (having held positions as a government delegate in the provinces and in consular missions), had a recognisably unhealthy and bordering on the sickly appearance (with yellowish skin or, in more extreme versions, greenish-looking)... but alas he above all else lacked the wealth. In truth, a good part of his life was spent struggling with serious financial difficulties (for further details, see Berrini 1993b and Matos 1993d).

Relative to this theme of decadence, and in terms of closing comments, we should again mention that as regards Martins' position, with its characteristic oscillations — between the epic triumph of the Aryans and the *Sinization* and final petrification, between the peaceful solution of conflicts at the heart of the Aryan brotherhood and the pitiless *struggle for life* even within its scope, and especially between preserving the "principle of hope" relative to the human genre and postulating the final victory of entropy —, seem to reflect a very aware influence of the "not yet!" which is, in fair summary, the core of the final attitude of Faust when faced by the inevitability of death³⁰. Just as Joaquim Pedro made perfectly clear in *Literature and*

³⁰ This is the last of Fausto's speeches, in the conclusion of the second half of the tragedy: "Alongside the hill/ Contaminating the advancing marsh;/ Hindmost, supreme of all triumphs/ Is the exhaustion of the corrupting mud-hole./ Gaining terrain inhabited by millions,/ Safe not, but free, but

Philosophy, and echoing the influences of Schopenhauer and Hartmann while simultaneously rejecting them:

"(...) alongside protesting my outrage I put forward the protest of my reason because the doctrine in which the Universe is condemned to annihilation by the course of existence is absurd, torturing itself without cause or motive for living what would be carnage. If there was Nothing before and there is afterwards this universal Existence, this existence cannot be a painful passion that nobody imposed on the Universe" (Martins 1955: 230-1).

Or, alternatively, in accordance with one of the recent commentators on his work, and in a reading highlighting what is perceived to be the ethical over-determination of the historical philosophy of Martins:

"With this Unconscious Force revealed as the life in organisms, and requiring their permanent renewal, death would be the «work of the negative», or more specifically, the final destiny of the living being is tending to die just as soon as they reach the plenitude of existence. However, despite this certainty, the postulates of reason were absolute and the end might be postponed whenever men act in accordance with the ideal, that is, to act as if humanity was eternal, which would inherently require the acceptance of destiny as a collective will" (Catroga 1996: 136).

We should however distinguish Martins from Martins' commentator and in this way seek to avoid any hagiographic inclinations so frequent in the latter. Similarly, we should also highlight that he thought his own Aryan society would succumb at the end

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active!/ The lushness of the fertile field! Men/ Seat on this new soil/ Desirable address, at the foot of the hillock,/ What audacious people, knowing to energetically nurture!/ Here, in the interior is a paradise;/ Outside beyond, the sea crashes and and the border reached;/ But, if it opens a breach to enter violently,/ A common effort to urgently repair./ Oh, yes! Such an idea has my every dedication,/ From wisdom stems the ultimate maxim:/ That are worthy of liberty and life / Only those who conquer such daily!/ Thus life prospers among dangers,/ Children, men, the aged pass by here./ Would I be able to see such endless movement!/ Free soil to treat as a free people!/ To the ephemeral moment, then shall it be said:/ «You are so beautiful, take your time! For centuries/ And centuries in my terrains are days/ do not erode the remains». — Now, right now,/ Only foretasting of such deliciousness,/ Fortunately do I enjoy the most celestial instant" (Goethe 1958: 523-4).

We clearly encounter here, without any difficulty, the forerunner of the desire for eternity, the worship of the moment and even the notion of living dangerously typical of Nietzschean inclination, alongside, and in contrast to, Comte's religion of humanity... among so many other acceptable readings.

of everything, with the Nothingness able to emerge whether out of sheer accident or by terminal entropy (or by accidents as an expression of entropy). His attitude, which tended towards the schizoid and alienation at least to the same extent to which Eça inclined towards a universal identification, might indeed be categorised as much more Nietzschean than Goethean given that he considers the human genre in its collective as a simple "seed", that is, as something that somehow *should be overcome*. However, it was also suggested how this attitude would be implicit above all to a Leibnizian influence in the shape of a trend towards "historical-cosmic relativisation" (idem: 136), perceived ours as being only "one of the possible worlds in an infinite universe" (idem: 136), and also being "humanity in its entirety a seed, the world a lump, among the myriads of seeds launched by the millions of worlds populating the spaces" (Martins cit. in idem: 136).

Meanwhile, and leaving aside these and other possible developments on this theme, the key point finally lies in highlighting the ambiguous place occupied by China both within the scope of Martins thoughts and within his fundamental rhetorical resources. As he so very eloquently wrote, almost in the tone of a precursor to that literature genre that in the 20th century became known as *science fiction*:

"Who can assure that our world is not destined to attain a limited level of culture and henceforth stop in a state which other worlds, if they were able to see us, might consider, if you will allow the expression, Chinese?" (Martins 1921 I: 60-1).

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